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Regional Courts and their jurisprudence in 2014: an increasingly important role?  
 
1. What happened in 2014? Most important decisions and why? 
2. Is there evidence of the regional influence of the decisions?  Of their influence beyond 
the regions? 
3. Are regional Courts cross-referencing each other? Referencing other jurisdictions? 
4. Are regional courts emerging as the most progressive judicial actors as far as FoE is 
concerned? Or is the overall picture more blurred?  
5. What are the most important issues on the agenda of regional courts in 2015? 
 
This report contains the material in support of the presentation on 10 March 2015 at Columbia 
University NY, on the role of regional courts in protecting the right of freedom of expression and 
information. It reviews the role and jurisprudence of the European regional courts in 2014 with 
regard the right to freedom of expression and information. The report especially highlights the 
judgments and decisions delivered by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. It also 
depicts the most important issues on the agenda for 2015, by referring to the freedom of expression 
cases actually pending before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. 
  
Introduction 
 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) shows how the Court’s rulings over a 
period of 35 years1 have helped to create an added value for the protection of freedom of 
expression, journalistic freedom, freedom of the media and public debate in the member states of 
the European Convention. In nearly 600 cases the ECtHR found violations of the right to freedom of 
expression and information as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR, hence developing a higher level of 
protection compared to that in the defendant national states’ jurisdictions. Under Article 10 ECHR 
interferences with the right to freedom of expression and information can only be justified when 
they are prescribed by law, pursue one of the legitimate aims under Article 10 § 2 ECHR and in as far 
as the interference is proportionate and justifiable. Any interference with the right to freedom of 
expression and information amounts to a violation of Article 10 ECHR, unless it has a legal and 
legitimate basis and is pertinently justified as corresponding to a pressing social need, hence being 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The European Court’s jurisprudence has clearly reduced the 
possibilities of interferences with the right guaranteed under Article 10 ECHR, by emphasizing 
precisely the characteristics of a democratic society in terms of tolerance, broadmindedness, 
pluralism and the importance of participation in public debate, including the protection of 
expressions, ideas and information that “shock, offend or disturb”. Very analogue to Article 10 ECHR, 
Article 11 of the EU-Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to freedom of expression 
and information, including media pluralism. Also the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU 
reflects the application of the right to freedom of expression, by referring in some cases to Article 10 
ECHR and/or to Article 11 of the EU-Charter for  Fundamental Rights. 
Some characteristics of the right to freedom of expression in Europe 
A crucial aspect that has helped to develop and enforce the right to freedom of expression “without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”, is the strict scrutiny by the European 
Court of interferences with an impact on the freedom of expression on matters of public interest, 
especially regarding the freedom of political expression and the role of the press as “public 
watchdog”. The recognition by the European Court of a horizontal effect of Article 10, assessing 
interferences with the right to freedom of expression by private persons or corporate organisations, 
and of the positive obligations for member states to protect and effectively create an environment 
for guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression has further extended the scope of that right in 
Europe. Another important factor that contributes to a substantial impact of Article 10 is the high 
                                                           
1
 ECtHR 26 April 1979, Case No. 6538/74, Sunday Times (n° 1) v. UK, was the first judgment in which the 
Court found a violation of Article 10 ECHR, as an injunction against the newspaper because of contempt of 
court was considered not being necessary in a democratic society for maintaining the authority of the judiciary, 
referring inter alia to the right of the public to be properly informed about matters of public interest. In the 
meantime more than a thousand judgments concern aspects related to the right to freedom of expression, media 
and journalism (see www.hudoc.echr.coe.int). For a general analysis, see D. Voorhoof, “Freedom of Expression, 
Media and Journalism under the European Human Rights System: Characteristics, Developments, and 
Challenges”, in: P. Molnàr (ed.), Free Speech and Censorship Around the Globe (Budapest - New York: Central 
European University Press: 2015), 59-104. An overview including a database on the most important case law of 
the ECtHR on freedom of expression, media and journalism can be found in an e-book on the subject, published 
by the European Audiovisual Observatory (Strasbourg: Iris). The first edition was published in December 2013 
and an updated version (including 2014 case law) is to be published in May 2015: 
http://www.obs.coe.int/documents/205595/2667238/IRIS+Themes+III+(final+9+December+2013).pdf/2e748bd
5-7108-4ea7-baa6-59332f885418. 
level of protection the Court has recognized vis-à-vis journalistic sources, whistleblowers, gathering 
of news and information, and more recently, the right of access to information held by public 
authorities. The Court has significantly upgraded freedom of expression of individuals, journalists, 
artists, academics, opinion leaders, NGOs and activists regarding their rights to receive, gather, 
express and impart information contributing to public debate in society. The Court also explicitly 
recognized the right of individuals to access the internet. In a ruling against the blocking of online 
content (on Google Sites), it asserted that the internet has now become one of the principal means 
of exercising the right to freedom of expression and information.2 
Restrictive trends? 
However, some restrictive trends in the approach of the Strasbourg Court have been identified, 
especially in a number of Grand Chamber judgments. The outcome and rationale of some judgments 
in which the Court has found no violation of the right to freedom of expression have raised  concerns 
regarding the future level of protection of press freedom in Europe compared to the “traditional” 
high standards of the Strasbourg case law in this matter.3  
The (near) future will show whether the European Court of Human Rights will keep on playing its role 
as ultimate guarantor of human rights in Europe and will be able to stand firm against the political 
pressure that has been felt the last few years surrounding the legitimacy and supervisory role of the 
European Court in securing human rights in the member states. This context may go some way in 
explaining the shift in direction surrounding the protection of freedom of expression and press 
freedom by the European Court in some of its judgments.4 
 
Or toward a higher standard of freedom of expression in Europe? 
Surveying the European Court’s jurisprudence of the last years shows however that the Court’s case 
law related to Article 10 of the Convention is still maintaining high standards of freedom of 
expression, media pluralism and protection of journalists, hence obliging member states to secure 
within their jurisdictions a higher threshold of freedom of expression and information. A series of 
recent judgments, also in 2014,5 clearly illustrate the awareness by the European Court of the utmost 
importance of freedom of expression and information in a democratic society. Especially the multiple 
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 ECtHR 18 December 2012, Case No. 3111/10, Ahmed Yildirim v. Turkey. See also ECtHR 10 March 2009, 
Case Nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, Times Newspapers Ltd. (n° 1-2) v. UK. 
3
 R. Ó Fathaigh and D. Voorhoof, “The European Court of Human Rights, Media Freedom and Democracy,” in 
M. Price, S. Verhulst, and L. Morgan, eds., Routledge Handbook of Media Law (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
107-124 and R. Ó Fathaigh and D. Voorhoof, “A review of the European Court's Freedom of Expression Cases 
in 2013”, in Proceedings of the Columbia University Global Freedom of Expression Project, Expert Meeting, 
25-26 February 2014, 13 p., at http://globalfreespeech.columbia.edu/report/europe-and-central-asia/review-
european-courts-freedom-expression-cases-2013 
4
 See e.g. recently ECtHR 16 January 2014, Case No. 45192/09, Tierbefreier e.V. v. Germany; ECtHR 30 
January 2014, Case No. 34400/10, De Lesquen du Plessis-Casso (n° 2) v. France; ECtHR 4 February 2014, 
Case No. 11882/10, Pentikäinen v. Finland (referred to Grand Chamber) and ECtHR 29 April 2014, Case No. 
23605/09, Salumäki v. Finland. 
5
 In 2014 the ECtHR found 47 violations of the right to freedom of expression and information. In 12 judgments 
it found no violation of that right. In other cases it relied on Article 10 in order to justify that there had not been a 
violation of Article 8 (right of privacy or right of reputation) in cases of alleged privacy breaching or defamatory 
media reporting. For a general overview about the ECtHR in 2014, see the annual report of the ECtHR on 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_Report_2014_ENG.pdf. 
references in the Court’s recent case law to the danger of a “chilling effect”6 and its impact on the 
finding of unjustified interferences with media and journalists’ and NGOs rights, help to secure a 
higher standard of freedom of expression and information through the interpretation and the 
application of Article 10 of the Convention. 
The way Article 10 of the Convention has been interpreted and applied by the ECtHR and has been 
promoted by the Council of Europe has undoubtedly helped to upgrade and improve the level of 
freedom of expression and media freedom in countries that became member states of the European 
Convention after the fall of the Berlin Wall (9 November 1989), such as the Baltic states (Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia), the Czech Republic and Slovenia.7 But also in countries that already had a long-
standing constitutional and democratic tradition, the right to freedom of expression and information 
has been broadened, strengthened and updated under the influence of Article 10 of the European 
Convention, especially regarding discussions on matters of public interest, in protecting 
newsgathering activities and journalistic sources, whistleblowing, access to public documents, media 
pluralism and internet freedom. In other Council of Europe member states that have less solid 
democratic institutions or that have experienced growing pains as they have moved toward 
democracy (such as in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine and 
Hungary), the issue of press freedom and freedom of (political) expression is still very problematic. 
Article 10 of the Convention has become a crucial instrument, however, to motivate, to stimulate or 
even to compel the national authorities of these countries to abstain from interfering in freedom of 
speech and press freedom, to respect freedom of public debate, political expression and critical 
journalism to a higher degree and to promote media pluralism and internet freedom. 
As Article 10 ECHR and the Court’s case law is applicable in the 47 member states of the Council of 
Europe, from Norway to Cyprus, from Iceland to Azerbaijan and from Portugal to Russia, it affects the 
freedom of expression of about 900 million people living in or under the jurisdictions bound by the 
ECHR.  
Structure of the 2014 report and brief overview of the case law on freedom of expression and 
information in Europe 
The first part of this report offers an overview of the most important 2014 (final) judgments 
delivered by the ECtHR. These judgments are clustered under the following items, emphasising the 
most important cases or trends in 2014: 
   - the right of access to official documents as protected by Article 10 ECHR, 
   - the protection of whistleblowers under Article 10 ECHR, 
   - freedom of political speech and  criticizing public persons and politicians,  
   - the balancing of Article 8 and 10 ECHR in relation to privacy and the right of reputation, 
   - the findings of continuing abuse of anti-terror law restricting freedom of expression in Turkey,  
   - and the repetitive violations of the rights of protesters and the right to peaceful assembly and  
     public demonstration in Russia. 
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 E.g., when criminal law is applied to prosecute and sanction journalists while reporting on matters of public 
interest, or in cases of prior restraint or when severe sanctions are imposed on media of journalists, or when 
journalists are prohibited no longer to exercise their profession .  
7
 See the positive developments in these countries reflected in the press freedom indexes of Reporters without 
Borders and Freedom House. 
The last part of the 2014 overview of the case law of the ECtHR refers to two decisions finding no 
breach of Article 10 ECHR in cases related to interferences with the protection of journalistic sources 
and searching of the newsroom. The review ends with a short analysis of two controversial 
judgments by the Grand Chamber, only indirectly dealing with the right to freedom of expression: 
the cases of Fernández Martínez v. Spain and S.A.S v. France, both mainly focussing on freedom of 
religion. 
This report also refers to the protection of fundamental rights in the EU and its 28 member states. 
Specifically the role of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in 2014 with regard to the protection of 
the right to freedom of expression and information (Art. 11 EU-Charter) will be highlighted by 
referring to some of its judgments related to copyright protection and enforcement of copyright 
when interfering with the right to freedom of expression and information.  Another perspective of 
attention is the EU Court’s case law regarding data protection and how the protection of privacy and 
personal data can affect the right to freedom of expression and information, as illustrated in the 
Google Spain-judgment (CJEU 13 May 2014). 
 
Due to a lack of sufficient relevant information over the year 2014 this report does not further 
elaborate on question 2 (“2. Is there evidence of the regional influence of the decisions?  Of their 
influence beyond the regions?”). With regard to question 3 (“3. Are regional Courts cross-referencing 
each other? Referencing other jurisdictions?”) the answer for both the ECtHR and the CJEU is “no”, as 
none of the analysed judgments in 2014 referred in its motivation to jurisprudence of other regional 
human rights courts, nor any other jurisdictions outside Europe. The European case law in 2014 on 
freedom of expression is based on the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECtHR), eventually some references to policy documents of the Council of Europe (Committee of 
Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly) and the EU-law (CJEU), without finding any further inspiration 
or authoritative arguments outside the jurisdictions of the ECHR and the EU. 
 
Whether the ECtHR and the CJEU showed in 2014 to be “progressive judicial actors as far as freedom 
of expression is concerned” (question 4) is substantiated by the many references in the first part of 
this report to the case law of both courts creating in a large amount of cases a higher threshold of 
protection of freedom of expression and information. A few judgments or decisions in which the 
ECtHR accepted occasionally far reaching or controversial interferences might give a more “blurred” 
picture, although the overall conclusion is that both courts in 2014 have applied or secured extra 
guarantees or a higher level of protection for freedom of expression in the European member states 
of the Council of Europe and the European Union.  A few examples which go in the other direction 
will be briefly presented. 
The final part of this report looks further ahead into 2015, as the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR is 
expected to deliver a series of judgments with a potentially high impact on the freedom of 
expression in Europe, as these all concern crucial aspects of the interpretation and application of the 
right to freedom of expression and information under the ECHR. Of the actually (on 10 March 2015) 
24 cases referred to the Grand Chamber, ten concern alleged violations of Article 10 of the 
Convention. It is obvious that the outcome of these Grand Chamber judgments will have an impact 
on the future development, the level and the characteristics of the protection of the right to freedom 
of expression in Europe and on the freedom of media, internet and journalism in this “region” of the 
world. Hence 2015 will be an important year for the right to freedom of expression, journalism and 
media freedom in Europe. The Grand Chamber judgments which are expected to be delivered in 
2015 applying Article 10 ECHR will undoubtedly attract our attention in the next report, reviewing 
the European 2015 case law on freedom of expression and information.  
At the very moment of the end-editing of this report, the Grand Chamber in a judgment of 23 April 
2015 has overruled an earlier finding of non-violation of the right to freedom of expression of a 
lawyer (Chamber, Fifth Section, 11 July 2013): with an extensively elaborated motivation the Grand 
Chamber comes to the conclusion that the applicant lawyer’s conviction for defamation of two 
investigative judges violated Article 10 of the Convention. It finds that  the lawyer, Morice, in the 
newspaper Le Monde had expressed value judgments with a sufficient factual basis and that his 
remarks concerning a matter of public interest, had not exceeded the limits of the right to freedom 
of expression.8 If this judgment, delivered by a unanimous Grand Chamber, sets the tune for the 
coming Grand Chamber judgments applying  Article 10 of the European Convention, we can look 
forward to more interesting rulings from the Strasbourg Court strictly scrutinising interferences at 
national level with the right to freedom of expression and information.  
                                                           
8 See I. Høedt-Rasmussen and D. Voorhoof, “A great victory for the whole legal profession”, Strasbourg 
Observers Blog 6 May 2015,  
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/05/06/a-great-victory-for-the-overall-profession-of-lawyers/#more-2848 
1. Most important (final) judgments and decisions by the ECtHR 
 
1.1. Access to official documents under the protection of Article 10 ECHR: ECtHR 24 June 2014, 
Roşiianu v. Romania, Appl. No. 27329/06. 
 
The ECtHR has reiterated, once more, that collecting information and guaranteeing access to 
documents held by public authorities is a crucial right for journalists in order to be able to report on 
matters of public interest, helping to implement the right of the public to be properly informed on 
such matters. In the case of Ioan Romeo Roşiianu, a presenter of a regional television programme, 
the Court came to the conclusion that the Romanian authorities have violated Article 10 ECHR by 
refusing access to the documents of a public nature Roşiianu had requested for at Baia Mare, a city in 
the north of Romania. The Court’s judgment clarifies that efficient enforcement mechanisms are 
necessary in order to make the right of access to public documents under Article 10 practical and 
effective. 
In his capacity as a journalist, Roşiianu had contacted the Baia Mare municipal authorities, requesting 
disclosure of several documents, as part of his investigation how public funds were used by the city 
administration. His requests were based on the provisions of Law no. 544/2001 on freedom of public 
information. As the reply by the mayor did not contain the requested information, Roşiianu applied 
to the administrative court. In three separate decisions, the Cluj Court of Appeal ordered the mayor 
to disclose the majority of the requested information. The Court of Appeal noted that, under Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Law no. 544/2001 on freedom of public 
information, Roşiianu was entitled to obtain the information in question, which he intended to use in 
his professional activity. The letters sent by the mayor of Baia Mare did not represent adequate 
responses to those requests. The Cluj Court of Appeal ordered the mayor to pay the applicant 700 
euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and held that his refusal to disclose the requested 
information amounted to a denial of the right to receive and impart information, guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the European Convention. Roşiianu applied for enforcement of the decisions, but the 
mayor refused to comply. The decisions delivered by the Cluj Court of Appeal remained unenforced. 
Roşiianu complained about the failure to execute the judicial decisions, relying on Article 6 § 1 (right 
to a fair trial/access to court). Relying on Article 10 ECHR he alleged that the failure to execute the 
decisions of the Cluj Court of Appeal amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of expression. 
With regard to the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, it is observed that the mayor had 
suggested Roşiianu to come in person to the town hall to obtain several thousand photocopied 
pages, against payment for the reproduction costs, but that the domestic courts had concluded that 
such an invitation could not possibly be considered as an execution of a judicial decision ordering the 
disclosure of information of a public nature. The European Court finds that the non-enforcement of 
the final judicial decisions ordering disclosure to Mr Roşiianu of public information had deprived 
Roşiianu of an effective access to a court, which amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 ECHR. 
With regard to the complaint under Article 10, the Court notes that Roşiianu was involved in the 
legitimate gathering of information on a matter of public importance, namely the activities of the 
Baia Mare municipal administration. The Court reiterates that in view of the interest protected by 
Article 10, the law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions which may become a form of indirect 
censorship should the authorities create obstacles to the gathering of information. Gathering 
information is indeed an essential preparatory step in journalism and is an inherent, protected part 
of press freedom. Given that the journalist’s intention had been to communicate the information in 
question to the public and thereby to contribute to the public debate on good public governance, his 
right to impart information had clearly been impaired. The Court finds that there had not been 
adequate execution of the judicial decisions in question. It also observes that the complexity of the 
requested information and the considerable work in order to select or compile the requested 
documents had been referred to solely to explain the impossibility of providing that information 
rapidly, but could not be a sufficient or pertinent argument to refuse access to the requested 
documents. The Court concludes that the Romanian authorities had adduced no argument showing 
that the interference in Roşiianu’s right had been prescribed by law, or that it pursued one or several 
legitimate aims, hence finding a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court holds that 
Romania is to pay the applicant 4.000 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 4.748 euros in 
respect of costs and expenses. 
 
1.2. Protection of whistleblowing: ECtHR 21 October 2014, Matúz v. Hungary, Appl. No. 73571/10. 
 
In its judgment in the case of Matúz v. Hungary the European Court confirms the importance of 
whistleblower protection. The case concerns the dismissal of a television journalist, Gábor Matúz, 
working for the State television company Magyar Televízió Zrt., after having revealed several 
instances of alleged censorship by one of his superiors. Matúz first contacted the television 
company’s president and sent a letter to its board, informing them that the cultural director’s 
conduct in modifying and cutting certain programme content amounted to censorship. A short time 
later an article appeared in the online version of a Hungarian daily newspaper, containing similar 
allegations and inviting the board to end censorship in the television company. A few months later 
Matúz published a book containing detailed documentary evidence of censorship exercised in the 
State television company. Subsequently Matúz was dismissed with immediate effect. Matúz 
challenged his dismissal in court, but he remained unsuccessful in his legal action in Hungary. After 
exhausting all national remedies, he lodged a complaint in Strasbourg, arguing a violation of his rights 
under Article 10 of the Convention. He submitted that he had the right and obligation to inform the 
public about alleged censorship at the national television company. The Hungarian government 
argued that by publishing the impugned book without prior authorisation and by revealing 
confidential information in that book, Matúz had breached his duties, leading to his summary – and 
justified – dismissal. 
The ECtHR accepts that the legitimate aim pursued by the impugned measure was the prevention of 
the disclosure of confidential information as well as “the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Once more the central question is 
whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court refers to its standard 
case law on freedom of expression and journalistic reporting on matters of public interest, and also 
observes that the present case bears a certain resemblance to the cases Fuentes Bobo v. Spain and 
Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland in which it found violations of Article 10 in respect of journalists who had 
publicly criticised the public television broadcaster’s management. Where the right to freedom of 
expression of a person bound by professional confidentiality is being balanced against the right of 
employers to manage their staff, the relevant criteria have been laid down in the Court’s case-law 
since its Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Guja v. Moldova (§§ 74-78). These criteria are: (a) 
public interest involved in the disclosed information; (b) authenticity of the information disclosed; (c) 
the damage, if any, suffered by the authority as a result of the disclosure in question; (d) the motive 
behind the actions of the reporting employee; (e) whether, in the light of the duty of discretion owed 
by an employee toward his or her employer, the information was made public as a last resort, 
following disclosure to a superior or other competent body; and (f) severity of the sanction imposed. 
The Court emphasises that the content of the book essentially concerned a matter of public interest 
and it confirms that it was not in dispute that the documents published by Matúz were authentic and 
that his comments had a factual basis. The Court also notes that the journalist had included the 
confidential documents in the book with no other intention than to corroborate his arguments on 
censorship, and that there was no appearance of any gratuitous personal attack, either (par. 46). 
Furthermore, the decision to make the impugned information and documents public was based on 
the experience that neither his complaint to the president of the television company nor letters to 
the board had prompted any response. Hence the Court “is satisfied that the publication of the book 
took place only after the applicant had felt prevented from remedying the perceived interference 
with his journalistic work within the television company itself – that is, for want of any effective 
alternative channel”. The Court also notes that “a rather severe sanction was imposed on the 
applicant”, namely the termination of his employment with immediate effect. The ECtHR is of the 
opinion that the approach by the Hungarian judicial authorities neglected to sufficiently apply the 
right of freedom of expression. The Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s right 
to freedom of expression was not “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, the Court 
unanimously finds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.9 
1.3. Freedom of political speech and  criticizing public persons and politicians: ECtHR 10 July 2014, 
Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 2), Appl. No. 48311/10 and ECtHR 17 April 2014, Brosa v. 
Germany, Appl. No. 5709/09. 
 
Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 2): violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
In a judgment of 10 July 2014, the European Court found that the publication by the daily newspaper 
Bild of suspicions concerning the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was covered by 
journalistic freedom. In Strasbourg, the publisher of Bild, Axel Springer AG, had lodged a complaint 
arguing that the German courts had interfered with the right to freedom of expression and critical 
press reporting in a way that violated Article 10 of the Convention.  
                                                           
9 See also D. Voorhoof, “Whistleblower protection for journalist who alarmed public opinion about censorship 
on TV”, Strasbourg Observers Blog 25 November 2014,  
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/11/25/whistleblower-protection-for-journalist-who-alarmed-public-opinion-
about-censorship-on-tv/#more-2698. This judgment was awarded as the best 2014 judgment of the ECtHR by 
Strasbourg Observers: http://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/02/12/the-results-are-in-poll-on-best-and-worst-
ecthr-judgment-of-2014/#more-2757. According to the organisers of the poll Matúz v. Hungary won, “because it 
clearly confirms the ECtHR’s strong commitment to providing much needed protection to whistleblowers’ 
freedom of expression in times when this is – politically speaking – a far from obvious, and therefore quite 
courageous, judicial position to take”. See also the Recommendation on the protection of whistleblowers,  
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 30 April 2014, at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2188855&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=ED
B021&BackColorLogged=F5D383 and: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/CDCJ%20Recommendations/CMRec(2014)7E.pdf  
An article in Bild had repeated a series of suspicions and doubts on the part of Mr Thiele – the deputy 
president of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (FDP) parliamentary group – with regard to Schröder’s 
appointment as chairman of the supervisory board of the German-Russian consortium Konsortium 
Nordeuropäische Gaspipeline (NEGP). Thiele had insinuated that Mr Schröder had resigned from his 
political functions because he had been offered a lucrative post in the consortium headed by the 
Russian company Gazprom. In this regard, references were made to an agreement on construction of 
a pipeline that has been signed in April 2005, in the presence of Mr Schröder and the Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. Having complained to the German courts, Mr Schröder obtained an order 
banning further publication of the passage which reported Mr Thiele’s comments and insinuations of 
corruption. 
The European Court sharply disagrees with the reasoning and findings of the German courts. The 
Court refers to the relevant criteria it has taken into consideration in earlier cases (see Von Hannover 
v. Germany (No. 2) and Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 1)), when dealing with the conflicting rights 
of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 and the right to protection of one’s reputation  
under Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to private life.  
First the Court notes that the article in Bild did not recount details of Mr Schröder’s private life with 
the aim of satisfying public curiosity, but related to Mr Schröder’s conduct in the exercise of his term 
of office as Federal Chancellor and his controversial appointment to a German-Russian gas 
consortium shortly after he ceased to hold office as Chancellor. Furthermore, there were sufficient 
facts which could justify suspicions with regard to Mr Schröder’s conduct, and such suspicions 
amounted to the expression of a value judgment, without concrete allegations of Schröder having 
committed criminal offences. The Court also observes that Mr Thiele’s questions were not the only 
comments to be reproduced in the Bild article, but supplemented a series of statements made by 
different political figures from various political parties.  
The Court could also not subscribe to the German courts’ opinion that the article in Bild ought also to 
have contained elements in favour of the former Chancellor. The former Chancellor had a duty to 
show a much greater degree of tolerance than a private citizen. In the political arena, freedom of 
expression is of the utmost importance and the press has a vital role as public “watchdog”. The 
punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person 
would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussions of matters of public interest. The 
Court also considers that a newspaper cannot be required to verify systematically the merits of every 
comment made by one politician about another, when such comments are made in the context of a 
current political debate. As to the severity of the measure imposed, the Court notes that although 
only a civil-law ban on further publication of the  impugned passage in the Bild article had been 
imposed, it nonetheless considers that this prohibition could have had a chilling effect on the 
newspaper’s freedom of expression. 
The Court concludes unanimously that Bild has not exceeded the limits of journalist freedom in 
publishing the disputed passage. The German courts have not established convincingly that there 
existed any pressing social need for placing the protection of Mr Schröder’s reputation above the 
newspaper’s right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting this freedom 
where issues of public interest were concerned. There had therefore been a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 Brosa v. Germany: violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
The ECtHR has also delivered an interesting judgment on the right to freedom of political expression, 
situated in pre-election time, in the case of Brosa v. Germany. The applicant, Mr Ulrich Brosa alleged 
that a court injunction in Germany, prohibiting him from distributing a leaflet that he had drawn up 
on the occasion of mayoral elections, had violated his right to freedom of expression. The injunction 
at issue prohibited Brosa from distributing a leaflet in which he called not to vote for a candidate, 
F.G., for local mayor who allegedly provided cover for a neo-Nazi organisation, Berger-88. The 
injunction also prevented Brosa from making other assertions of fact or allegations which might 
depict F.G. as a supporter of neo-Nazi organisations. Any contravention was punishable by a fine of 
up to 250.000 euros or by imprisonment of up to six months. The German courts found that to claim 
that someone was supporting a neo-Nazi organisation amounted to an infringement of that 
individual’s honour and social reputation and to his personality rights, while Brosa had failed to 
provide sufficient evidence to support his allegation against F.G. In Strasbourg, Brosa complained 
that the injunction had breached his right to freedom of expression, as provided for in Article 10 of 
the Convention.  
Examining the particular circumstances of the case, the Court refers to the following elements to be 
taken into account: (1) the position of the applicant, (2) the position of the plaintiff in the domestic 
proceedings, (3) the subject matter of the publication and finally (4) the classification of the 
contested statement by the domestic courts. As to the position of Brosa, the Court notes that he is a 
private individual, participating however in a public discussion on the political orientation of an 
association. F.G. was an elected town councillor who was running for the office of mayor at the 
material time. This status of F.G. as a politician made the limits of acceptable criticism wider than as 
regards a private individual. The subject matter of the publication concerned a leaflet asking citizens 
not to vote for F.G. as mayor, primarily on the basis of his attitude vis-à-vis an association with an 
extremist right-wing orientation. Brosa’s leaflet, disseminated in the run-up to the mayoral elections 
was therefore of a political nature on a question of public interest at the material time and location, 
leaving only little scope for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of public 
interest. As regards the qualification of the impugned statement by the domestic courts, the Court 
considers it to consist of two elements: firstly, the allegation that the association Berger-88, was a 
neo-Nazi organisation that, moreover, was particularly dangerous; and, secondly, the allegation that 
F.G. had “covered” for the organisation. The Court admits that, in substance, the reference to the 
neo-Nazi background and the dangerous character of Berger-88 was not devoid of a factual basis, 
while the Court also reminds to the fact that the association was monitored by the German 
Intelligence Services on suspicion of extremist tendencies. The European Court holds the opinion that 
that the German courts in this case required a disproportionately high degree of factual proof to be 
established. It also considers that the statement that F.G. has covered the neo-Nazi organisation at 
issue, was part of an ongoing debate. The Court finds that this statement had a sufficient factual 
basis, referring to F.G.’s public statements, emphasizing that the association had no extreme right 
wing tendencies and calling Brosa’s statements “false allegations”. According to the Court Brosa’s 
leaflet did not exceed the acceptable limits of criticism. Therefore the Court comes to the conclusion 
that the German courts failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests and to establish 
a "pressing social need" for putting the protection of the personality rights of F.G. above Brosa’s right 
to freedom of expression, even in the context of a civil injunction rather than criminal charges or 
monetary compensation claims. Under these circumstances, the Court considers that the domestic 
courts overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to them and that the interference was 
disproportionate to the aim pursued and not “necessary in a democratic society”.  There has been, 
accordingly, a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court holds that Germany is to pay Brosa  
3.000 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 2.683 euros in respect of costs and expenses.10 
Other relevant cases: 
- ECtHR 17 April 2014, Mdladina dd. Ljubljana v. Slovenia, Appl. No. 20981/10: violation of Article 
10 ECHR. 
Insulting a MP as “cerebral bankrupt” in an article in a magazine was considered being protected by 
Article 10 ECHR. The Court interprets the impugned statement as an expression of strong 
disagreement, even contempt for S.P.’s position, rather than a factual assessment of his intellectual 
abilities. Viewed in this light, the description of the parliamentarian’s speech and conduct can be 
regarded as a sufficient foundation for the author’s statement. The author’s critical opinions were 
coloured by a number of evocative, exaggerated expressions. But as Article 10 protects both the 
content and the form of expression the Court considers that even offensive language, which may fall 
outside the protection of freedom of expression if its sole intent is to insult, may be protected by 
Article 10 when serving merely stylistic purposes. The Court also considers that the statement did not 
amount to a gratuitous personal attack on S.P. and the Court also points out that political invective 
often spills over into the personal sphere, this being the hazards of politics and the free debate of 
ideas, which are the guarantees of a democratic society. 
 
- ECtHR 14 October 2014, Stankiewicz and others v. Poland, Appl. No. 48723/07: violation of Article 
10 ECHR. 
The case concerns allegations  about bribery by a government official. The allegations were part of a 
newspaper article published by two journalists. The journalists alleged that the Head of the Private 
Office of the Minister of Health (Szef Gabinetu Politycznego Ministra Zdrowia), W.D., had demanded 
a bribe from representatives of a pharmaceutical company, offering in return his assistance in having 
a drug manufactured by the company placed on the list of drugs refunded within the framework of 
the national health care scheme. The Polish courts held that the article had infringed the personal 
rights of W.D. and that the applicants’ conduct had been unlawful within the meaning of Article 24 of 
the Civil Code read in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the 1984 Press Act and infringed 
the claimant’s reputation and trust that was necessary in the exercise of his public duties.  The two 
journalists  were ordered to publish an apology in their newspaper and to pay EUR 1,100 in court 
fees and to reimburse the costs of EUR 1,550 to W.D. The ECtHR however considers this interference 
with the right to freedom of expression of the two journalists as a breach of Article 10 ECHR. It is 
obvious for the ECtHR that the matters discussed in the applicants’ article concerned issues of public 
interest while the limits of acceptable criticism are wider with regard to a person holding a public 
office than with regard to a private individual. The Court finds that the national courts applied an 
overly rigorous approach to the assessment of the journalists’ professional conduct. In contrast with 
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the findings of the domestic courts, the ECtHR considers that the applicants complied with the tenets 
of responsible journalism. The research done by the applicants before the publication of their 
allegations was in good faith and complied with the ordinary journalistic obligation to verify the facts 
from reliable sources. The European Court is of the view that the allegations against W.D. were 
underpinned by a sufficient factual basis. It should also be noted that the content and the tone of the 
article was on the whole fairly balanced. The applicants, having approached a number of sources, 
gave as objective picture as possible of W.D. and offered him to present his version of the relevant 
events and to comment on the allegations raised. W.D.’s version of events was presented in the 
article. In the instant case, the domestic courts did not take into account the status of W.D. and the 
wider limits of permissible criticism applicable to politicians or public officials. Nor did they 
appreciate that the subject-matter of the publication concerned issues of public interest or the role 
of the press as a “public watchdog”. In consequence, the judicial authorities did not carry out 
a careful balancing exercise between the right to impart information and protection of the 
reputation or rights of others. Therefore the reasons relied on by the respondent State to justify the 
interference with the journalists’ right to freedom of expression, although relevant, are not sufficient 
to show that that interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. There has accordingly been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
- ECtHR 21 October 2014, Erla Hlynsdottir v. Iceland (no. 2), Appl. No. 54125/10: violation of Article 
10 ECHR 
In this case an Icelandic journalist had been convicted for defamation after reporting that the 
director of a Christian rehabilitation centre and his wife had been involved in sex games with patients 
of the centre. The ECtHR finds a violation of Article 10 of European Convention on Human Rights, 
arguing that the national courts did not pertinently balance the right to freedom of expression with 
the right to reputation. The Court  refers to “the essential function the press fulfils in a democratic 
society” as a central factor for its determination in the present case. In Erla Hlynsdottir (no. 2), the 
European Court criticizes the Icelandic domestic courts for not conducting their own evaluation of 
the impugned statements and for not sufficiently motivating why an interference with the 
journalist’s right to freedom of expression corresponded to a pressing social need in the case at 
issue. Accordingly, the Court establishes that when national courts face claims for alleged 
defamatory statements published by media, they have to carry on their own assessment in order to 
verify if the journalist had sufficient factual proof to substantiate the allegations. The Court continues 
by emphasizing that “in cases such as the present one the national margin of appreciation is further 
circumscribed by the interest of democratic society in enabling the press to exercise its vital role of 
‘public watchdog’ in imparting information of serious public concern” (§ 57). According to the Court it 
also requires “the most careful scrutiny” when national authorities interfere with the right to 
freedom of expression and journalistic reporting in a manner that might discourage the participation 
of the press in debates over matters of legitimate concern for society. The Court finds that the 
reporting was balanced and that the journalist had conducted responsible journalism and acted in 
good faith. However, while assessing the attempts of journalists to verify facts of the article, the 
Court pertinently reiterates that it is not up to the European Court, nor to the domestic judicial 
authorities to decide what techniques of reporting should be used by journalists.  
The unanimous judgment and the reasoning by the European Court in this case reflect the awareness 
in Strasbourg of the importance of upholding high standards of critical, factually based, investigative 
reporting on matters of public interest, which inevitably may cause harm to the reputation of public 
figures involved in embezzlement of public funds or sexual abuse as in the case at issue. It is 
reassuring to notice that in case of a conviction for defamation of a journalist in such circumstances, 
the European Court applies the most strict scrutiny under Article 10 of the Convention, especially 
when interferences at national level are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in 
debates over matters of legitimate public concern. 11 
- ECtHR 15 May 2014, Taranenko v. Russia, Appl. No. 19554/05: Slogan “Putin resign”. 
Violation of Article 11 (in relation with Article 10) ECHR, cf. infra. 
- The Court however found no violation of Article 10 ECHR in ECtHR 2 December 2014, Albrecht 
Kieser and Peter Tralau-Kleinert  v. Germany Appl. No. 18748/10 (decision).  
The ECtHR dismissed the applicants’ complaints, as it considered the defamatory allegations of a very 
serious nature, presented as statements of fact rather than value judgments, while the allegations 
turned out to lack a factual basis. The applicants not only expressed a personal opinion and 
commented on events in the past, they gave the impression of revealing publicly unknown incidents 
concerning the role of a family during the Nazi regime. The Court also observes that the applicants 
were given the opportunity to prove the veracity of the published information and that the standard 
of proof applied by the domestic courts in those proceedings did not make this task unreasonable or 
impossible in the circumstances (compare with ECtHR 17 April 2014, Brosa v. Germany, Appl. No. 
5709/09, § 48, cf. supra). Therefore the Court is satisfied that the findings of the domestic courts 
were based on acceptable assessments of the relevant facts. The domestic courts’ decisions reveal 
moreover that they had carefully examined whether the applicants had fulfilled their journalistic 
obligation of properly verifying their statements of fact before disseminating them. They came to the 
conclusion that, having regard to the gravity of the allegations and the political sensitivity of the 
subject, the applicants failed to provide sufficient proof for the statements. As to whether there were 
grounds for dispensing the applicants from their ordinary obligation to verify their statements, the 
Court first notes that the allegations raised in the article were of a serious nature. The Court 
underlines that the applicants not only failed to verify the authority of their sources, but also failed to 
present their story in a reasonably balanced manner. Moreover it is not apparent that they gave the 
members of the family the opportunity to defend themselves in advance. Therefore, there were no 
grounds for dispensing the applicants from their journalistic obligations. Finally, with regard to 
whether the measures taken against the applicants at domestic level were proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued, the Court points out that the applicants did not face criminal proceedings, 
nor were they ordered to pay damages. In fact, in the civil proceedings, the domestic courts only 
ordered the applicants to refrain from creating such impressions as those published in the article, 
subject to a penalty of up to 250,000 euros for each contravention, a reasonable measure where a 
person’s reputation has been tarnished by published information. As the application disclosed no 
appearance of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the ECtHR decided  to reject the 
application as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 
- No blanket immunity for heads of state in order to guarantee their right of freedom of speech and 
protect them against libel action: ECtHR 2 December 2014, Urechean and Pavlicenco v. Moldova, 
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Appl. Nos. 27756/05 and 41219/07: violation of Article 6 § 1 ECHR. 
In a case against Moldova, the European Court decided that a blanket immunity in defamation 
proceedings in order to guarantee the free speech rights of a president is to be considered as 
breaching Article 6 § 1 (right of access to a court) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Court has been called to examine many cases concerning limitation of the right of access to a court in 
defamation cases by operation of parliamentary immunity, but this was the first  occasion on which 
the  Court  had to address the immunity from a civil libel suit from which a president or a head of 
State benefits. 
The applicants in this case, Mr Urechean and Mrs Pavlicenco, were politicians of  opposition parties 
at the time. In two television programmes the president of the Republic of Moldova had been 
interviewed by journalists on various topics such as the economy, justice, foreign relations and 
elections. In the interviews the president stated, among other things, that Mr Urechean as the mayor 
of Chişinău had created “a very powerful mafia-style system of corruption”. About Mrs Pavlicenco 
the president stated that she “came straight from the KGB”. Both politicians brought libel suits 
against the president, but the Moldovan courts held that the president enjoyed immunity and could  
not be held liable for opinions which he expressed in the exercise of his mandate. Before the 
European Court Urechean and Pavlicenco contended that the refusal of the domestic courts to 
examine the merits of their libel actions constituted a violation of their right of access to a court, as 
guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
It was undisputed that there was a limitation of the applicants’ right of access to a court as a result of 
the refusal of the domestic courts to examine the merits of their libel actions against the president. 
The parties also agreed that the limitation of their right was prescribed by law and pursued a 
legitimate aim. While the applicants considered that the immunity enjoyed by a president should be 
narrower than that enjoyed by MPs, the Government argued the contrary and maintained that it 
should be wider. The Court, for its part, is not ready to accept either of these positions and it 
examines, as in the cases concerning parliamentary immunity, whether in the circumstances of the 
case a fair balance was struck between the competing interests involved, namely between the 
public’s interest in protecting the president’s freedom of speech in the exercise of his functions and 
the applicants’ interest in having access to a court and obtaining a reasoned answer to their 
complaints. 
The Court finds that, in the circumstances of the case, such a fair balance had not been struck. 
Although a head of State’s task is not, unlike that of an MP, to be actively involved in public or 
political debates, the Court considers that it should be acceptable in a democratic society for States 
to afford some functional immunity to their heads of State in order to protect their free speech in the 
exercise of their functions and to maintain the separation of powers in the State. Nevertheless, such 
immunity, being an exception from the general rule of civil responsibility shall be regulated and 
interpreted in a clear and restrictive manner. In particular the Court is of the opinion that the 
Moldovan courts had not addressed the question of whether the then president of Moldova had 
made the statements about the applicants  in the exercise of his mandate. Nor did the relevant 
constitutional provision define the limits of presidential immunity in libel actions. The Court 
furthermore observes that the immunity afforded to the president was perpetual and absolute: the 
applicants could not have had access to the courts even after the expiry of his mandate, and 
moreover, the president’s immunity against libel actions could not be lifted. The Court considers that 
conferring such blanket immunity on the Head of State in the application of the rule of immunity was 
to be avoided. 
The lack of alternative means of redress is another issue that has been considered by the Court, as 
the Government submitted that the applicants, being politicians, should have resorted to the media 
to express their points of view on the President’s allegations about them. The Court however is not 
persuaded that the applicants had at their disposal an effective means of countering the accusations 
made against them by the head of State during the television interviews at issue. 
The Court concludes, by four votes to three, that the manner in which the immunity rule was applied 
in the instant case constituted a disproportionate restriction on the applicants’ right of access to a 
court and hence constituted a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. According to the three 
dissenting judges, the Moldovan courts had sufficiently motivated that the opinions expressed by the 
president during the television interviews fell within the exercise of his mandate and related to 
public life. They also emphasise the fairness of the judicial proceedings at the national level. 
According to the dissenters, the applicants could have relied on their right of reply or on other 
national legislation providing for a number of alternative means of redress in cases of defamation of 
honour, dignity and professional reputation, while these means were not illusory and could be 
achieved in practice. Furthermore, in their capacity as politicians the applicants fell within the 
category of persons open to close scrutiny of their acts, not only by the press but also – and above all 
– by bodies representing the public interest, thus the risk of some uncompensated damage to 
reputation being inevitable. For these reasons the dissenters support the presidential immunity, 
finding no violation of Article 6 § 1 ECHR. 
1.4. Balancing Article 8 (privacy/reputation/image) with Article 10 ECHR and the application of the 
“Von Hannover/Axel Springer AG”-criteria (GC 7 February 2012) in defamation and privacy cases 
Another characteristic of the 2014 case law is that the Court’s jurisprudence, in cases of alleged 
breach of privacy and defamation, balances the rights under Article 8 and 10, applying the well-
structured format developed by the Grand Chamber in its judgments of 7 February 2012 (Von 
Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) and Axel Springer AG v. Germany). In such cases, the Courts evaluates 
step by step the six criteria of the balancing test of the right to privacy and reputation and the right 
to freedom of expression,  namely (1) the contribution to a debate of general interest, (2) the subject 
of the report and if it concerned a public figure, (3) the prior conduct of the person concerned, (4) 
the method of obtaining the information and its veracity, (5) the content, form and consequences of 
the media content and (6) the severity of the sanction imposed. Some cases concern an application 
because of alleged violation of Article 8: these applications are lodged against the findings by 
national authorities that the press reporting was guaranteed under Article 10. In other cases the 
applicant journalists, editors of publishers complain about the violation of their rights under Article 
10, as the domestic courts have allegedly overprotected the rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 
1.4.a. Balancing Article 8 and 10 from the perspective of Article 8 and privacy protection: ECtHR 16 
January 2014, Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway, Appl. No. 13258/09.  
Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway: no violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
The applicants in this case are Lars Lillo-Stenberg and Andrine Sæther, a well-known musician and 
actress in Norway, who complained about press invasion of their privacy during their wedding on 20 
August 2005. The European Court found that the Norwegian authorities did not fail to comply with its 
obligations under Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention, balancing 
the applicants’ right to privacy with the right of freedom of expression by the media publishing the 
pictures at issue, as part of reporting about the wedding.  
 
Without the couple’s consent, the weekly magazine Se og Hør published a two-page article about the 
applicants’ wedding accompanied by six photographs. The wedding took place outdoors on an islet in 
the Oslo fjord accessible to the public. The pictures were obtained by hiding and using a strong 
telephoto lens from a distance of approximately 250 meters. The pictures showed the bride, her 
father and bridesmaids arriving at the islet in a small rowing boat, the bride being brought to the 
groom by her father and the bride and groom returning to the mainland on foot by crossing the lake 
on stepping stones. The couple brought compensation proceedings against the magazine and won 
before the first two instances, but finally the Supreme Court found against the couple, by three votes 
to two. It considered that they had married in a place which was accessible to the public, easily 
visible, at a popular holiday location. Furthermore the article was neither offensive nor negative. 
Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Lars Lillo-Stenberg and Andrine 
Sæther complained that their right to respect for private life had been breached by the Supreme 
Court’s judgment. 
The European Court starts from the premise that the present case requires an examination of the fair 
balance that has to be struck between the applicants’ right to the protection of their private life 
under Article 8 of the Convention and the publisher’s right to freedom of expression as guaranteed 
by Article 10. The Court confirms “that a person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his 
or her personality, as it reveals the person’s unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from 
his or her peers. The right to the protection of one’s image is thus one of the essential components 
of personal development. It mainly presupposes the individual’s right to control the use of that 
image, including the right to refuse publication thereof” and that “even where a person is known to 
the general public, he or she may rely on a “legitimate expectation” of protection of and respect for 
his or her private life”. The Court again applies the criteria it considers relevant where the right of 
freedom of expression is being balanced against the right to respect for private life (see also Von 
Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) and Axel Springer AG v. Germany, 7 February 2012, Grand Chamber). 
These relevant criteria are : (i) contribution to a debate of general interest; (ii) how well known is the 
person concerned and what is the subject of the report?; (iii) prior conduct of the person concerned; 
(iv) method of obtaining the information and its veracity/circumstances in which the photographs 
were taken and (v) content, form and consequences of the publication. In the opinion of the 
European Court, both the majority and the minority of the Norwegian Supreme Court have carefully 
balanced the right of freedom of expression with the right to respect for private life, and explicitly 
took into account the criteria set out in the Court’s case-law. The Court considered that there was an 
element of general interest in the article about the applicants’ wedding and that the article did not 
contain any elements that could damage their reputation. Since the wedding took place in an area 
that was accessible to the public, easily visible, and a popular holiday location, it was likely to attract 
attention by third parties. Being well known public figures in Norway, these circumstances certainly 
lowered their legitimate expectation of privacy, while on the other hand no pictures where published 
of the private marriage ceremony itself. Although the Court considers that “opinions may differ on 
the outcome of a judgment”, it sees no sufficient strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the 
majority of the Norwegian Supreme Court. Having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
the national courts when balancing competing interests, the Court concludes that the Supreme Court 
did not fail to comply with its obligations under Article 8 of the Convention. The interference with the 
right of privacy of the applicants was sufficiently justified by the right to freedom of expression of the 
magazine Se og Hør. 
This case also indicates that if the Norwegian judicial authorities had come to a different result in 
finding a breach of privacy by Se og Hør, and if a case by the magazine would have been introduced 
as an alleged violation of Article 10, the ECtHR might have accepted the interference with the 
magazine’s freedom of expression, referring to the margin of appreciation as well as to the 
circumstance that both the majority and the minority of the Norwegian Supreme Court have 
carefully balanced the right of freedom of expression with the right to respect for private life, and 
explicitly took into account the criteria set out in the Court’s case-law which existed at the relevant 
time (notably Von Hannover (no. 2) and Axel Springer AG). 
Other relevant cases: 
- ECtHR 14 January 2014, Lavric v. Romania, Appl. No. 22231/05: violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
In this case a public figure complained about the failure of the Romanian courts to convict a 
journalists for defaming her. The Romanian courts held that the litigious article was an allowable 
exaggeration and provocation, protected under Article 10 ECHR. The ECtHR however found this a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR. The Court considers that the accusations concerning the applicant’s 
alleged corruption and incompetence were of a serious nature and were capable of affecting her in 
the performance of her duties and of damaging her reputation.  A person’s status as a politician or 
other public figure does not remove the need for a sufficient factual basis for statements which 
damage his or her reputation, even where such statements are considered to be value judgments, 
and not statements of fact. The Court notes that there is no indication that the applicant committed 
any offence of forgery or bribery in connection with the performance of her professional activity. In 
conclusion, the Court considers that the journalist failed to prove that he had written the articles 
with the professional care required of journalists. Therefore, it is not appropriate to make reference 
to the leeway generally permitted to journalists for provocation or exaggeration when articles 
concern public figures. 
- ECtHR 9 December 2014, Yevgeniy Yakovlevich DzhugashviliI v. Russia, Appl. No. 41123/10 
(decision): no violation of Article 8 ECHR.  
The applicant, who is a grandson of Stalin, argued in Strasbourg that the Russian Courts had failed to 
protect his well-known ancestor from attacks on his reputation. In 2009 Novaya Gazeta, an 
opposition newspaper, published in its feature supplement, Pravda Gulaga, an article entitled “Beria 
pronounced guilty”, which dealt with the shooting of Polish prisoners in Katyń in 1940.  The article 
was written in accusatory terms in respect of the former USSR government and included, among 
others, statements in which Joseph Stalin was considered responsible for the Katyń massacre. It was 
stated in the newspaper article that “Stalin and the members of the Politburo of the VKP(b) who took 
a legally binding decision to shoot the Poles evaded moral responsibility for the extremely serious 
crime”. Stalin was described as a “bloodthirsty cannibal”. Having considered that the article 
slandered his grandfather, the applicant sued the publishing house, Novaya Gazeta, and the author, 
Mr Ya., for defamation. But the Russian courts dismissed the claim. 
The ECtHR notes that the domestic courts considered the contribution made by the disputed 
publications to the debate of general interest, the role of the person concerned as well as the 
subject, the content, the form and the information value of the publications. Firstly, they based their 
reasoning on the premise that the publications contributed to the factual debate over the events of 
exceptional public interest and importance. Secondly, they found that the historic role of the 
applicant’s ancestor called for a higher degree of tolerance to public scrutiny and criticism of his 
personality and his deeds. Finally, turning to the content and the form, the national courts noted the 
highly emotional character of some statements, but found them within the limits of acceptable 
criticism. The ECtHR also observes that the national courts explicitly took account of the Court’s 
relevant case-law, including the general distinction between statements of facts and value 
judgments. Accordingly the Court considers that the domestic courts have struck a fair balance, 
required in the context of the State’s positive obligations, between the journalist’s freedom of 
expression under Article 10 and the applicant’s right under Article 8 ECHR. 
1.4.b. Balancing Article 8 and 10 from the perspective of Article 10 in cases related to the right of 
reputation of public persons: ECtHR 10 July 2014, Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 2), Appl. No. 
48311/10 (cf. supra); ECtHR 4 November 2014, Braun v. Poland, Appl. No. 30162/10; ECtHR 14 
January 2014, Ruusunen v. Finland, Appl. No. 73579/10 and Ojala and Etukeno Oy v. Finland, Appl. 
No. 69939/10. 
Braun v. Poland: violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
The applicant (a historian and film director) in this case was found liable of defamation in a civil case 
because of a statement during a radio debate in which he stated that a well-known professor in his 
country, J.M., had been a secret collaborator with the communist regime. The ECtHR considers that 
the statement was part of a public debate on an important issue. Most importantly the ECtHR is 
unable to accept the domestic courts’ approach that required the applicant to prove the veracity of 
his allegations. It was not justified, in the light of the Court’s case-law and in the circumstances of the 
case, to require the applicant to fulfil a standard more demanding than that of due diligence only on 
the ground that the domestic law had not considered him a journalist. The domestic courts, by 
following such an approach, had effectively deprived the applicant of the protection afforded by 
Article 10. Although the national authorities’ interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of 
expression may have been justified by a concern to restore the balance between the various 
competing interests at stake, the reasons relied on by the domestic courts cannot be considered 
relevant and sufficient under the Convention. This conclusion cannot be altered by the relatively 
lenient nature of the sanction imposed on the applicant. There has accordingly been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
Ruusunen v. Finland and Ojala and Etukeno Oy v. Finland: no violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
These two cases concern the former Finnish Prime Minister’s girlfriend’s conviction for violating his 
privacy following disclosure of sexual encounters in a book she wrote and a publisher’s conviction for 
publishing the memoir of the Prime Minister’s girlfriend which had violated his privacy. In both cases 
the ECtHR finds no violation of Article 10 ECHR. The ECtHR accepts the domestic courts’ finding that 
parts in the book describing the sex life of the Prime Minister and his girlfriend in the beginning of 
their relationship,  the descriptions of their brief and passionate intimate moments as well as giving 
massages to each other, and accounts of their sexual intercourse, fell within the core area of the 
private life of the former Prime Minister. The ECtHR finds that the unauthorised publication of this 
kind of information was conducive of causing the former Prime Minister suffering and contempt and 
it considered it necessary to restrict the applicants’ freedom of expression in this respect in order to 
protect the former Prime Minister’s private life. As the sanctions imposed only concerned fines, the 
ECtHR finds the interference reasonable and justified, in accordance with Article 10 § 2 ECHR. Hence 
it finds no violation of the right to freedom of expression of the applicants. 
1.5. Abuse of anti-terror law in Turkey continues: ECtHR 25 March 2014, Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey, 
Appl. Nos. 39690/06, 40559/06,48815/06, 2512/07, 55197/07, 55199/07, 55201/07 and 55202/07: 
violations of Article 10 ECHR. 
In eight judgments of 25 March 2014 the ECtHR, once more, has found gross violations of the right to 
freedom of expression and information in Turkey. Each of the judgments  concern the criminal 
conviction of publishing declarations from an illegal armed organisation in application of anti-terror 
law. The applicant in all of the eight cases is Hasan Bayar, the editor-in-chief of the Ülkede Özgür 
Gündem daily newspaper, based in Istanbul. In 2004 the newspaper published a series of statements 
and articles expressing, in various ways, the positions of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), as 
well as statements by its leaders. It also published appeals from prisoners to the Turkish Government 
to negotiate with Mr Öcalan, the PKK leader. Other articles described events linked to Mr Öcalan’s 
incarceration. Some of the statements from the PKK or Congra-Gel or PJA, a branch of the PKK, 
concerned the political situation of the Kurds, the role of women in society and appeals for 
democratisation and peace. One article, reproducing declarations of the leader of Congra-Gel, 
protested against the visit of the Turkish prime Minister to Iran. After the publication of each article, 
the public prosecutor charged Mr Bayar and the owner of the newspaper with spreading propaganda 
via the press and publishing material from an illegal armed organisation. On each occasion Mr Bayar 
and the owner of the newspaper were convicted in application of the anti-terrorism act nr. 3713 and 
they were ordered to pay a fine. Mr Bayar appealed to the Court of Cassation against each of these 
decisions, arguing that his rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention had been 
violated. But all the appeals by Mr Bayer were declared inadmissible. 
 
The Strasbourg Court is of the opinion that Mr Bayer’s right under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) is 
violated, as the Court of Cassation had wrongfully declared his appeals inadmissible. The ECtHR also 
finds that Mr Bayer’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 is violated, as the Court sees no 
pertinent reason to justify Mr Bayer’s conviction. The Court says that it is aware of the difficulties the 
fight against terrorism was confronted with, but it emphasises at the same time the importance of 
the right to freedom of expression, by notifying that the impugned articles did not encourage 
violence, armed resistance or insurrection and did not constitute hate speech. According to the 
ECtHR this was crucial  and it could not find any pertinent and sufficient reasons to justify any of the 
interferences with the editor-in-chief’s right to freedom of expression. 
 
Other relevant cases: 
- ECtHR 21 January 2014, Perihan and Mezopotamya Basin Tayin A.Ş. v. Turkey, Appl. No. 21377/03 
- ECtHR 17 June 2014, Belek and Özkurt (nos. 2-7) v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. (..) 10752/09 
- ECtHR 17 June 2014, Aslan and Sezen (nos. 1-2) v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 43217/04 and 15066/05 
- ECtHR 27 May 2014, Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 346/04 and 39779/04, in 
which the ECtHR found a violation of Article 10, due to an interference by the Turkish judicial 
authorities because of defamatory criticism on judges of the Constitutional Court expressed in an 
article in a magazine. When account is taken of the content of the article as a whole, and the context 
in which they were expressed, the Court is of the opinion that the impugned strong and harsh 
remarks contained in the article, set out in general terms, with respect to the judges of the 
Constitutional Court, cannot be construed as a gratuitous personal attack against the claimants. The 
Court also reaffirms that the courts, as with all other public institutions, are not immune from 
criticism and scrutiny. In particular, a clear distinction must be made between criticism and insult. If 
the sole intent of any form of expression is to insult a court, or members of that court, an 
appropriate sanction would not, in principle, constitute a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
The Court considers that some of the language and expressions used in the article in question, 
notably those highlighted by the domestic courts, were harsh and that they could be perceived as 
offensive. They were, however mostly, value judgments, coloured by the author’s own political and 
legal opinions and perceptions. In this connection, the Court also observes that they were based on 
the manner in which the Constitutional Court ruled on certain issues and that these rulings, including 
the dissolution of the Fazilet Party, were already subject to virulent public debate, as the applicant 
sought to demonstrate in the domestic proceedings. They could therefore be considered to have had 
a sufficient factual basis. The Court finally considers that the interference with the applicants’ 
freedom of expression was not based on sufficient reasons to show that the interference complained 
of was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation and rights of others.12 
- ECtHR 21 October 2014, Murat Vural v. Turkey, Appl. No. 9540/07 (cf. infra, conviction of 13 year 
imprisonment for pouring paint on statue of Atatürk violated Article 10 ECHR). 
1.6. Denial of the rights of protesters and violations of the right to peaceful assembly and public 
demonstration continue in Russia: ECtHR 15 May 2014, Taranenko v. Russia, Appl. No. 19554/05 
The European Court’s judgment in the case Taranenko v. Russia illustrates how Article 10 ECHR, in 
relation with Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association), protects collective action, expressive 
conduct and distribution of leaflets as a form of protected speech. The case concerns the detention 
and conviction of Ms Taranenko, a participant in a protest against the politics of President Putin in 
2004. The protesters  had occupied the reception area of the President’s Administration building in 
Moscow and locked themselves in an office. They waved placards with “Putin, resign!” («Путин, 
уйди!») and distributed leaflets with a printed address to the President that listed ten ways in which 
he had failed to uphold the Russian Constitution, and a call for his resignation. One of the protesters, 
Taranenko, complained in Strasbourg about the way the Russian authorities afterwards have treated, 
detained, prosecuted and convicted here for participating in this protest action, claiming that her 
right to freedom of expression and her right of peaceful assembly had been violated. 
The Court reiterates that “the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic 
society and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society. Thus, 
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it should not be interpreted restrictively”. The Court also emphasizes that any measures interfering 
with freedom of assembly and expression “other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection 
of democratic principles do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it”. The Court notes 
that the issues of freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly are closely linked in the 
present case: “Indeed, the protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10 of the Convention, 
is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 of the 
Convention”. The European Court underlines that the protest, although involving some disturbance 
of public order, had been largely non-violent and had not caused any bodily injuries. The participants 
in the protest action came to the President’s Administration building to meet officials, hand over a 
petition criticising the President’s policies, distribute leaflets and talk to journalists. The aim of the 
protesters in Moscow was indeed to obtain media-exposure, in which they effectively succeeded. 
The disturbance that followed was not part of their initial plan but a reaction to the guards’ attempts 
to stop them from entering the building. In this context, the Court also examines with particular 
scrutiny the prison sentence as a sanction imposed by the national authorities for non-violent 
conduct. The Court finds in particular that while a sanction for Taranenko’s actions might have been 
warranted by the demands of public order, her detention pending trial of almost one year and the 
suspended prison sentence of three years imposed on her had to have had a deterring effect on 
protesters. The Court considers the pre-trial detention and the prison sentence as an “unusually 
severe sanction” having a chilling effect on Taranenko and other persons taking part in protest 
actions. The Court refers to the “exceptional seriousness of the sanctions” as being disproportionate 
and therefore concludes that the interference had not been necessary in a democratic society for the 
purposes of Article 10. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 10 interpreted in the light of 
Article 11 of the Convention. 
Other relevant cases: 
- ECtHR 12 June 2014, Primov a.o. v. Russia Appl. No. 17391/06: violation 11 ECHR. 
Protest ban by Russian authorities breached Article 11. 
- ECtHR 31 July 2014, Nemtsov v. Russia, Appl. No. 1774/11: violation of Article 11 ECHR 
In this case a leader of the opposition was arrested and convicted while participating in an authorized 
demonstration, for shouting anti-government slogans. Boris Nemtsov was a politician who has held 
in the past the posts of Nizhniy Novgorod governor, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister for Energy. 
He later became one of the best-known opposition leaders in Russia, a founder of the political party 
the Union of Right Forces, and subsequently of the political movement Solidarnost. On 27 February 
2015 Boris Nemtsov was assassinated in Moscow. In its judgment of 31 July 2014 the ECtHR notes 
the lack of any acknowledgments that the acts imputed to the applicant by the police, namely an 
attempted call for a spontaneous demonstration and the chanting of anti-government slogans, were 
by themselves protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. An order to stop those actions – 
had they truly occurred – required strong justification in order to be lawful. The courts dispensed 
with those considerations. The administrative proceedings against Nemtsov and his ensuing 
detention had the effect of discouraging him from participating in protest rallies or indeed from 
engaging actively in opposition politics. Undoubtedly, those measures had a serious potential also to 
deter other opposition supporters and the public at large from attending demonstrations and, more 
generally, from participating in open political debate. The chilling effect of those sanctions was 
further amplified by the fact that they targeted a well-known public figure, whose deprivation of 
liberty was bound to attract broad media coverage. In view of the foregoing the ECtHR finds that the 
applicant’s arrest and the charges against him had not been justified by a pressing social need. 
Therefore, the ECtHR concludes that the interference with the applicant’s right to peaceful assembly 
could not be justified under the requirements of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. 
Other cases of protest and disruptive or ‘symbolic speech’: 
- ECtHR 23 September 2014, Vajnai v. Hungary, Appl. No. 6061/1: violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
The Court recalls that it has already found that the prosecution of a left-wing politician, participating 
in a peaceful demonstration for wearing a five-pointed red star on his jacket was an admissible 
complaint and constituted a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
- ECtHR 30 October 2014, Shvydka v. Ukraine, Appl. No. 17888/12: violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
In the present case the applicant detached the ribbon from the wreath laid by the President of 
Ukraine at the monument to a famous Ukrainian poet on Independence Day, and that act was 
witnessed by many people.  The applicant was arrested and was kept 10 days in detention. The 
applicant in this case submitted that, by having detached the ribbon with the inscription “President 
of Ukraine V.F.Yanukovych” from the wreath laid by Mr Yanukovych, she had expressed her utter 
disagreement with his policies, including oppression of the opposition. According to her, that act was 
also meant to express her protest against the imprisonment of the opposition leader Ms Yuliya 
Tymoshenko. Furthermore, the applicant sought to show her frustration with the constraints 
imposed on the public as a result of the security arrangements for Mr Yanukovych in the context of 
the wreath-laying ceremony. She emphasised that she had neither damaged the wreath itself nor 
disturbed public order. Having regard to the applicant’s conduct and its context, the Court accepts 
that by her act she sought to convey certain ideas in respect of the President to the people around 
her. That act can therefore be regarded as a form of political expression. Accordingly, the Court 
considers that penalising the applicant for it with ten days’ detention amounted to an interference 
with her right to freedom of expression. The Court accepted the finding by the domestic authorities 
that the act of the applicant could be qualified as “petty hooliganism” and could justify penalising her 
with a sanction envisaged by the relevant provision complied with the requirement of lawfulness. 
The Court is of the opinion however that the domestic courts applied to the applicant, a sixty-three-
year-old woman with no criminal record, the harshest sanction for what in fact constituted a 
wrongdoing not involving any violence or danger. In doing so, the court referred to the applicant’s 
refusal to admit her guilt, thus penalising her reluctance to change her political views. The Court sees 
no justification for that and considers the measure to be disproportionate to the aims pursued. The 
Court therefore concludes that the applicant’s right to freedom of expression has been violated. 
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
- ECtHR 21 October 2014, Murat Vural v. Turkey, Appl. No. 9540/07: violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
In this case the applicant was arrested and later convicted for the offence of contravening the Law on 
Offences Committed against Atatürk, as at several occasions the applicant had poured paint on the 
statue of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk , the founder and the first President of the Republic of Turkey. The 
applicant argued that he had carried out his actions with a view to expressing his dissatisfaction with 
those running the country in accordance with the Kemalist ideology, and to criticising the Kemalist 
ideology itself. The Government considered that defiling Atatürk’s statues was considered to be an 
act of vandalism with the element of insulting Atatürk’s memory. By virtue of the nation’s deep sense 
of respect and adoration for Atatürk, his memory was protected by law.  The applicant was 
sentenced to a total of thirteen years, one month and fifteen days’ imprisonment. The ECtHR 
reiterates that Article 10 of the Convention protects not only the substance of the ideas and 
information expressed, but also the form in which they are conveyed. Indeed, a review of the Court’s 
case-law shows that Article 10 of the Convention has been held to be applicable not only to the more 
common forms of expression such as speeches and written texts, but also to other and less obvious 
media through which people sometimes choose to convey their opinions, messages, ideas and 
criticisms. The wearing or displaying of symbols has also been held to fall within the spectrum of 
forms of “expression” within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention: as in two earlier cases 
(Vajnai v. Hungary and Fratanoló v. Hungary), the Court accepted that the wearing of a red star in 
public as a symbol of the international workers’ movement must be regarded as a way of expressing 
political views and that the display of such vestimentary symbols fell within the ambit of Article 10 of 
the Convention. Similarly, the Court held that the display of a symbol associated with a political 
movement or entity, like that of a flag, was capable of expressing identification with ideas or 
representing them and fell within the ambit of expression protected by Article 10 of the Convention 
(Fáber v. Hungary). The Court also has held that opinions, as well as being capable of being 
expressed through the media of artistic work and the wearing or displaying of symbols as set out 
above, can also be expressed through conduct and that protests can constitute expressions of 
opinion within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court also refers to another 
judgment in which it held that the applicant party’s slogans, even if they had been accompanied by 
the burning of flags and pictures, were a form of expressing an opinion in respect of an issue of major 
public interest, namely the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Moldova (Christian 
Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (no. 2)). The Court continues by emphasizing that Article 10 of 
the Convention protects not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the 
form in which they are conveyed . Therefore the Court considers that the same can be said for any 
individual who may wish to convey his or her opinion by using non-verbal and symbolic means of 
expression. The Court notes that the applicant was convicted for having poured paint on statues of 
Atatürk, which, from an objective point of view, may be seen as an expressive act and that the 
applicant was not found guilty of vandalism, but of having insulted the memory of Atatürk. The Court 
says that it is aware that Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey, is an iconic figure in modern 
Turkey and considers that the Parliament chose to criminalise certain conduct which it must have 
considered would be insulting to Atatürk’s memory and damaging to the sentiments of Turkish 
society.  Nevertheless, the Court is struck by the extreme severity of the penalty foreseen in 
domestic law and imposed on the applicant, that is over thirteen years of imprisonment. It also notes 
that as a result of that conviction the applicant has been unable to vote for over eleven years. In 
principle, the Court considers that peaceful and non-violent forms of expression should not be made 
subject to the threat of imposition of a custodial sentence. While in the present case, the applicant’s 
acts involved a physical attack on property, the Court does not consider that the acts were of a 
gravity justifying a custodial sentence as provided for by the Law on Offences against Atatürk.  Thus, 
having regard to the extreme harshness and grossly disproportionate character of the punishment 
imposed on the applicant, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 10 ECHR, 
such an interference not being “necessary in a democratic society”.  
 
- ECtHR 11 February 2014, Martin Donat v. Germany and Maleen Fassnacht-Albers v. Germany 
Appl. Nos. 6315/09 and 12134/09 (decision) : no violation of Article 11 ECHR. 
In this case against Germany the ECtHR finds no violation of the right to peaceful demonstration, the 
applications were dismissed as manifestly ill-founded. The ECtHR considers that a short time of 
detention by the police was necessary in a democratic society, as both applicants had been 
reasonably suspected of coercion at the relevant time and the impugned police measures were 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of the prosecution of offences, although later the criminal 
proceedings against them have been discontinued on grounds of insignificance. 
1.7. Protection of journalistic sources, destruction of sources and searching the newsroom. 
ECtHR 30 September 2014, Colm Keena and Geraldine Kennedy v. Ireland (case of The Irish Times), 
Appl. No. 29804/10 (Decision): no violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
In this case the ECtHR was of the opinion that the deliberate destruction of journalistic “sources” in 
order to prevent access by the judiciary could not be justified under Article 10 ECHR. In the summer 
of 2009, the Irish Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion, overturning an order issued against the 
newspaper The Irish Times to answer questions about a leaked document it had received from an 
anonymous source. Few months later however, the Supreme Court decided that the newspaper was 
required to pay the legal costs of the government-created body that had sought the order, because 
the newspaper had destroyed its copy of the leaked document before the legal action had 
commenced. The ECtHR ruled in Keena and Kennedy v. Ireland that the imposition of costs on the 
newspaper, even though its action was successful, was not a violation of Article 10 ECHR. According 
to the Court the ECHR does not confer on individuals the right to take upon themselves a role 
properly reserved to the courts. As the domestic courts underscored, this is, effectively, what the 
applicants did through the deliberate destruction of the very documents that were at the core of the 
Tribunal’s inquiry. Even if, as the applicants submitted, they did not intend, at that point in time, to 
prevent full judicial examination of the issue, this was clearly the effect of their actions.  
 
The ECtHR does not accept that the applicant journalists could not have reasonably foreseen that the 
Tribunal would react as it did when confidential information was published in a national newspaper 
or that it would take such steps as were available to it to uphold the integrity of the inquiry. It was 
after the Tribunal had signaled its right to have recourse to the courts and after it had ordered the 
production of documents that the applicant journalists decided to destroy the evidence that would 
be central to the courts’ resolution of the competing public interests in issue.  While Keena and 
Kennedy  complained of the chilling effect of the costs order on freedom of expression, the ECtHR 
considers that the order for costs in the circumstances of this case can have no impact on public 
interest journalists who vehemently protect their sources yet recognise and respect the rule of law. 
The Court can discern nothing in the costs ruling to restrict publication of a public interest story, to 
compel disclosure of sources or to interfere in any other way with the work of journalism. What the 
ruling signified was that all persons must respect the role of the courts, and that nobody, journalists 
included, may usurp the judicial function. The European Court considers that the true purport of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling was to signal that no party is above the law or beyond the lawful jurisdiction 
of the courts. Therefore, the ECtHR concludes that there was no interference with the applicants’ 
right to freedom of expression, and the complaint is considered manifestly ill-founded.13 
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 ECtHR 27 May 2014, Stichting Ostade Blade v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 8406/06 (Decision): no 
violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
In this decision, the ECtHR finds that a search and confiscation of computers and other editorial 
materials and data did not breach Article 10 of the Convention, mainly because the judicial 
authorities were trying to identify the perpetrator of a series of bomb attacks and that they had good 
reason to believe that the confiscated material at a magazine newsroom could help their 
investigation. The applicant foundation in this case is the publisher of the bi-weekly magazine 
“Ravage” which appeared once every two weeks. On 2 May 1996 the magazine issued a press 
release in which it announced the upcoming issue of the magazine, to be released the following day, 
which would include the letter of the Earth Liberation Front (“ELF”) claiming responsibility for three 
recent bomb attack  that took place in Arnhem (“ELF’s letter”). The next day a search of the 
magazine’s premises took place following the issuance of a search warrant by the Arnhem Regional 
Court. The search took place under supervision of an investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) and 
was carried out in the context of criminal investigations against the perpetrators of the three bomb 
attacks that had occurred in Arnhem. When informed that the judicial authorities were in search of 
ELF’s letter, an editor of the magazine, Mr K., informed the investigative judge that the letter was not 
present on the premises. When it became apparent that it would take much time to make copies of 
all the relevant materials, the investigating judge asked Mr K. whether he wished the copying to 
continue at the magazine’s premises or whether he preferred the police to take the relevant 
materials away to continue copying somewhere else. Mr K. chose the latter. The police took four 
computers which included the subscriber database as well as lists of addresses, a large number of 
application forms of new subscribers, address wrappers, a diary (agenda), a telephone index 
(telefoonklapper), a typewriter, data of contact persons and other editorial materials as well as 
private data of the editors.  The seized computers were returned to the magazine on 6 May and 
9 May 1996. The investigating judge informed the applicant foundation’s lawyer that the computer 
files would not be shared with third parties without his permission, and that the police and public 
prosecutor were aware of this. As nothing relevant was found, a few weeks later, in a letter to the 
lawyer, the investigating judge stated that all the documents and had been destroyed. Complaints 
about the violation of the magazine’s right of privacy and freedom of expression under Article 8 and 
10 of the Convention were dismissed by the Netherlands courts. 
 
Invoking Article 10 of the Convention the applicant foundation complained that the search for the 
letter on the magazine’s premises had violated its right to receive and impart information.  Invoking 
Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 8 and 10 ECHR it also complained that as it had not received 
any compensation, the interference by the authorities also violated its right to an effective remedy. 
 
The ECtHR finds that the order to hand over the letter, which was followed by a search of the 
applicant foundation’s premises when it was not obeyed, constituted an interference with the 
applicant foundation’s right to “receive and impart information”, as set out in Article 10 § 1. 
The ECtHR however clarifies that it was not dealing with an interference restricting the protection of 
journalistic sources. According to the ECtHR it is undeniable that, even though the protection of a 
journalistic “source” properly so-called is not in issue, an order directed to a journalist to hand over 
original materials may have a chilling effect on the exercise of journalistic freedom of expression. The 
degree of protection under Article 10 of the Convention to be applied in the actual situation did not 
reach the same level as that afforded to journalists when it comes to their right to keep their 
“sources” confidential. The distinction lies in that the latter protection is twofold, relating not only to 
the journalist, but also and in particular to the “source” who volunteers to assist the press in 
informing the public about matters of public interest. In the present case the magazine’s informant 
was not motivated by the desire to provide information which the public were entitled to know. On 
the contrary, the informant, was claiming responsibility for crimes which he had himself committed; 
his purpose in seeking publicity through the magazine Ravage was to don the veil of anonymity with 
a view to evading his own criminal accountability. For this reason, the ECtHR takes the view that he 
was not, in principle, entitled to the same protection as the “sources” in other cases, like in Goodwin 
v. UK, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, Ernst and Others v. Belgium, Voskuil v. The Netherlands, 
Tillack v. Belgium, Financial Times v. UK, Sanoma v. The Netherlands and Telegraaf v. The 
Netherlands. Turning  to the question of “necessity in a democratic society”, the ECtHR notes that 
the original document received by the editorial board of the magazine Ravage was sought as a 
possible lead towards identifying a person or persons unknown who were suspected of having 
carried out a plurality of bomb attacks. Having regard to the inherent dangerousness of the crimes 
committed, the ECtHR is of the opinion that this constitutes sufficient justification for the 
investigative measures in issue. Furthermore the ECtHR takes into account that all materials seized 
were returned, with the exception of a typewriter ribbon which was destroyed, and that all 
information not relevant to the investigation was likewise destroyed, while there is no indication  
that the authorities had destroyed the confidentiality of information entrusted to the magazine’s 
editors. In the circumstances, which are further characterised by the fact that the search was 
occasioned by the wilful destruction of the letter, the Court is not disposed to lay the blame on the 
authorities. The ECtHR rejects the application as manifestly ill-founded, also with regard the alleged 
violation of Article 13 of the Convention. 
 
1.8. Fernández Martínez v. Spain and S.A.S. v. France: two controversial judgments by the Grand 
Chamber, finding no violation of the ECHR in cases related to the freedom of religion.14 
 
ECtHR 12 June 2014, Fernández Martínez v. Spain, Appl. No. 56030/07: publicity in the press of  
married status of priest who supported criticism on the doctrine of the Catholic church can lead to 
termination of contract as teacher of Catholic religion and ethics:  no violation of the ECHR 
From October 1991 onwards, the applicant was employed as a teacher of Catholic religion and ethics 
in a State-run secondary school of the region of Murcia under a renewable one-year contract. He was 
a former priest but in the meantime a married man and the father of five children. He was granted 
dispensation by the Pope from celibacy, with the consequence that he lost his clerical “state”. The 
applicant complained about the non-renewal of his contract of employment in 1997, after the 
publicity in the press that the applicant had given to his personal situation. It was not the applicant 
himself who published an article in the Murcian newspaper La Verdad about his views or his family 
life, but it was a journalist who wrote about a meeting of the Movement for Optional Celibacy” of 
priests (MOCEOP) and included both a photograph of the applicant and his family and a description 
of the views held by a group of former priests including the applicant. 
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 The Grand Chamber recognises that various Convention articles, in particular Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11, 
are relevant for the assessment of the case. Article 8 is relevant in so far as it encompasses the 
applicant’s right to continue his professional life, his right to respect for his family life and his right to 
live his family life in an open manner. Article 9 is relevant in so far as it protects the applicant’s right 
to freedom of thought and religion. Article 10 is relevant in so far as it protects the applicant’s right 
to express his opinions about official Church doctrines and Article 11 in so far as it guarantees his 
right to be a member of an organisation holding specific views on issues concerning religion. In the 
Court’s view, however, the main issue in the present application lies in the non-renewal of the 
applicant’s contract. The Court states that the applicant did not complain about being prevented 
from holding and disseminating certain views or from being a member of the MOCEOP. The gist of 
his complaint is that he was not able to remain a teacher of the Catholic religion as a direct 
consequence of the publicity given to his family situation and of the fact that he was a member of 
the MOCEOP. For that reason the Grand Chamber takes the view, like the Chamber, that the 
application should be examined under Article 8 of the Convention. 
  
The Court was called upon to rule on a conflict between two rights that are equally protected by the 
Convention. In such a case, it must weigh up the interests at stake. This balancing exercise concerns 
the applicant’s right to his private and family life, on the one hand, and the right of religious 
organisations to autonomy, on the other. The autonomous existence of religious communities is 
indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the 
protection which Article 9 of the Convention affords. It has a direct interest, not only for the actual 
organisation of those communities but also for the effective enjoyment by all their active members 
of the right to freedom of religion. Respect for the autonomy of religious communities recognised by 
the State implies, in particular, that the State should accept the right of such communities to react, in 
accordance with their own rules and interests, to any dissident movements emerging within them 
that might pose a threat to their cohesion, image or unity. That being said, a mere allegation by a 
religious community that there is an actual or potential threat to its autonomy is not sufficient to 
render any interference with its members’ rights to respect for their private or family life compatible 
with Article 8 of the Convention. In addition, the religious community in question must also show, in 
the light of the circumstances of the individual case, that the risk alleged is probable and substantial 
and that the impugned interference with the right to respect for private life does not go beyond what 
is necessary to eliminate that risk and does not serve any other purpose unrelated to the exercise of 
the religious community’s autonomy. Neither should it affect the substance of the right to private 
and family life. 
 
With regard to the publicity given by the applicant to his situation as married priest, the ECtHR finds 
that in choosing to accept a publication about his family circumstances and his association with what 
the Bishop considered to be a protest-oriented meeting, he severed the special bond of trust that 
was necessary for the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him. Having regard to the importance of 
religious education teachers for all faith groups, it was hardly surprising that this severance would 
entail certain consequences. Thus, in the present case the problem lies in the fact that the applicant 
could be understood to have been campaigning in favour of his way of life to bring about a change in 
the Church’s rules, and in his open criticism of those rules. In the Court’s view, the had also 
expressed support for contraception and  disagreement with the Catholic Church’s positions on other 
subjects such as abortion, birth control and the optional celibacy of priests. Although this kind of 
remark falls within the freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the Convention, that does 
not mean that the Catholic Church was precluded from acting on them, in the enjoyment of its 
autonomy, which is also protected by the Convention, under Article 9. In this connection, the Court 
observes that in assessing the seriousness of the conduct of an individual employed by the Church it 
is necessary to take into account the proximity between the person’s activity and the Church’s 
proclamatory mission. In the present case, that proximity is clearly very close. In the Court’s view, the 
fact of being seen as campaigning publicly in movements opposed to Catholic doctrine clearly runs 
counter to the duty of loyalty towards the Catholic Church. In addition, there is little doubt that the 
applicant, as former priest and director of a seminary, was or must have been aware of the substance 
and significance of that duty. The Court also refers to the fact that the applicant had been teaching 
adolescents, who were not mature enough to make a distinction between information that was part 
of the Catholic Church’s doctrine and that which corresponded to the applicant’s own personal 
opinion. The Grand Chamber finally noted that, for the purposes of the present case, a less restrictive 
measure for the applicant would certainly not have had the same effectiveness in terms of 
preserving the credibility of the Church. It thus does not appear that the consequences of the 
decision not to renew his contract were excessive in the circumstances of the case, having regard in 
particular to the fact that the applicant had knowingly placed himself in a situation that was 
completely in opposition to the Church’s precepts. 
 
The ECtHR also finds that the domestic courts took into account all the relevant factors in this case 
and, even though they emphasised the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, they weighed up 
the interests at stake in detail and in depth. In conclusion, having regard to the State’s margin of 
appreciation, the Court is of the view, by a narrow 8-9 split decision, that the interference with the 
applicant’s right to respect for his private life was not disproportionate.  Accordingly, there has been 
no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court also held that there was no need to examine 
separately the complaints under Articles 9 and 10, taken separately or together with Article 14 of the 
Convention. 
 
The eight dissenting judges inter alia emphasise that the termination of the contract was not based 
on any criticism publicly voiced by the applicant, but merely on his family situation and his 
membership of an association of married priests. They also refer to the fact that the majority 
conclude that “the applicant could be understood to have been campaigning in favour of his way of 
life to bring about a change in the Church’s rules”, referring to “his open criticism of those rules” (§ 
137  and 141 “being seen as campaigning publicly”). The dissenters argue that such a conclusion 
cannot be drawn from the facts of the case. 
 
ECtHR 1 July 2014, S.A.S. v. France, Appl. No. 43835/11: “living together” and the so-called burqa-
ban: no violation of the ECRH. 
The applicant in S.A.S. v. France is a devout Muslim wearing the burqa and niqab in accordance with 
her religious faith, culture and personal convictions. She complained of a violation of her right to 
respect for her private life, her right to freedom to manifest her religion or beliefs and her right to 
freedom of expression, together with discrimination in the exercise of these rights, because of a new 
law in France prohibiting for anyone to conceal their face in public places. She relied on Articles 8 
(privacy), 9 (religion) and 10 of the Convention, taken separately and together with Article 14 (non-
discrimination). The Court is of the view that personal choices as to an individual’s desired 
appearance, whether in public or in private places, relate to the expression of his or her personality 
and thus fall within the notion of private life. Consequently, the ban on wearing clothing designed to 
conceal the face in public places, pursuant to the French Law of 11 October 2010, falls under Article 8 
of the Convention. That a category of religious people consequently are prevented from wearing in 
public places clothing that the practice of their religion requires them to wear, also raises an issue 
with regard to the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs (Article 9). The Court evaluated the 
applicant’s argument solely from these two perspectives, leaving aside the Article 10 claim by the 
applicant. This is as such a remarkable approach, as the Court in other occasions had applied Article 
10 in cases of wearing symbols, covered by the right to freedom of expression. 
 
In evaluating whether the interference with the applicant’s rights could be justified under Articles 8 § 
2 and especially under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, the Court dismissed some of the arguments of 
the French Government, such as the public safety argument and the respect for equality between 
men and women. The Court also takes the view that, however essential it may be, respect for human 
dignity cannot legitimately justify a blanket ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public places. 
The Court is aware that the clothing in question is perceived as strange by many of those who 
observe it. It points out, however, that it is the expression of a cultural identity which contributes to 
the pluralism that is inherent in democracy. It notes in this connection the variability of the notions 
of virtuousness and decency that are applied to the uncovering of the human body. Moreover, the 
Court does not perceive any evidence capable of leading it to consider that women who wear the 
full-face veil seek to express a form of contempt against those they encounter or otherwise to offend 
against the dignity of others. Very surprisingly however the Court, referring to the “respect for the 
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society”, accepts that the barrier raised against 
others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of 
others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier. The Court indeed takes 
into account the respondent State’s point that the face plays an important role in social interaction. 
It can understand the view that individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish to see 
practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into question the possibility 
of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an 
indispensable element of community life within the society in question. The Court finds that the 
impugned ban can be regarded as justified in its principle in so far as it seeks to guarantee the 
conditions of “living together” in a society. It accepts that it falls within the powers of the State to 
secure “the conditions whereby individuals can live together in their diversity”. Having regard in 
particular to the breadth of the margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State in the 
present case, the Court finds that the ban imposed by the French Law of 11 October 2010 can be 
regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of “living 
together” as an element of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Accordingly, there 
has been no violation either of Article 8 or of Article 9 of the Convention. The Court furthermore 
admits that the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 may have specific negative effects on 
the situation of Muslim women who, for religious reasons, wish to wear the full-face veil in public, 
but as this measure has an objective and reasonable justification for the reasons indicated 
previously, there is no violation of Article 14 of the Convention either. 
 
After its finding of non-violation of the articles 8, 9 and 14, the Court is of the view that no issue 
arises under Article 10 of the Convention, taken separately or together with Article 14 of the 
Convention, that is separate from those that it has examined under Articles 8 and 9 of the 
Convention, taken separately and together with Article 14 of the Convention. 
 
It is interesting to notice that the Grand Chamber refers in this judgment to its earlier case law on 
religious hate speech. The Court emphasises that a State which enters into a legislative process of 
introducing a ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places, on the basis of 
Islamophobic motives, takes the risk of contributing to the consolidation of the stereotypes which 
affect certain categories of the population and of encouraging the expression of intolerance, when it 
has a duty, on the contrary, to promote tolerance. The Court reiterates that “remarks which 
constitute a general, vehement attack on a religious or ethnic group are incompatible with the values 
of tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination which underlie the Convention and do not fall 
within the right to freedom of expression that it protects (..)” (§ 149). 
  
1.bis The CJEU, human rights, internet, protection of personal data and 
copyright 
Introduction 
 
Case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) of the last few years has accepted the delimitation 
of intellectual property and copyright law when conflicting with other fundamental rights.15 In Scarlet 
Extended v. Sabam (2011) the CJEU made clear that “the protection of the fundamental right to 
property, which includes the rights linked to intellectual property, must be balanced against the 
protection of other fundamental rights”, including the right to freedom of expression and 
information guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.16 The CJEU confirmed this approach in 
Sabam v. Netlog NV (2012), reiterating that an injunction requiring the installation of a filtering 
system that would involve monitoring all or most of the information stored by a hosting service 
provider in the interests of those right-holders, would be in breach with the right of information. The 
CJEU stated that such an injunction “could potentially undermine freedom of information, since that 
system might not distinguish adequately between unlawful content and lawful content, with the 
result that its introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful communications”.17 Again in 2014 the 
CJEU has delivered some interesting judgments balancing copyright protection with the right to 
freedom of expression and information. 
 
In 2014 the CJEU has also delivered and interesting judgment with regard E-Commerce  and the 
limited liability of ISP’s. The CJEU clarifies that since a newspaper company publishing an online 
version of its newspaper on its website has, in principle, knowledge about the information which it 
posts and exercises control over that information, it cannot be considered to be an “intermediary 
service provider” within the meaning of Articles 12 to 14 of Directive 2000/31. 
 
Before presenting the 2014 case law of the CJEU balancing IP and copyright law with the right to 
freedom of expression and information and applying the principles of the E-commerce Directive on 
the liability of ISP’s and online news fora, a brief reference is made to probably the most (in)famous 
judgment of the CJEU in 2014, judgment that is to be situated in the domain of protection of 
personal data and the right to freedom of expression.18 As this judgment, which is often labelled as 
having established a “right to be forgotten, will be more thoroughly analysed and discussed in 
another session, by other rapporteurs, only the very essence of this ruling of the CJEU is presented.19 
                                                           
15
 See e.g. CJEU 1 December 2011, Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer, in which the CJEU refers to the impact 
of Article 10 ECHR “having regard to the purpose of the press, in a democratic society governed by the rule of 
law, to inform the public, without restrictions other than those that are strictly necessary” and CJEU 18 July 
2013, Case C-201/11 P, UEFA v. Commission, in which the CJEU stated in the case of major events that 
UEFA’s property rights under Article 17 of the EU Charter were indeed affected by Article 3a of Directive 
85/552 and that in this case the obstacle to the right of property was justified by the objective of protecting the 
right to information and ensuring wide access by the public to television coverage of events of major importance. 
16
 CJEU 24 November 2011, Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended NV v. Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, 
Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM). 
17
 CJEU 16 February 2012, Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA 
(SABAM) v. Netlog NV. 
18
 On this issue see also the earlier case of the European Court of Justice: ECJ 16 December 2008, Case C-73/07, 
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, Satamedia Oy. 
19 For an elaborate analysis, see the Guidelines on the implementation of the CJEU judgment in the Google Spain 
case by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 26 November 2014,  
Apart from the Google-Spain judgment, also another CJEU judgment on data protection and esp. 
date retention in the fight against terrorism, will be briefly referred to. 
 
Overview of the case law of the CJEU 2014  
 
Cases related to data protection and freedom of expression and information 
 
- CJEU 13 May 2014, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, C-131/12 (Grand Chamber): request for removal of personal 
data in list of results of search engine 
The CJEU clarifies that the operator of a search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect 
of processing personal data in the meaning of Article 2(d) of the Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 
1995. The operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed 
following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, published by third 
parties and containing information relating to that person, also in a case where that name or 
information is not erased beforehand or simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as the case 
may be, when its publication in itself on those pages is lawful. A person (data subject) has a right that 
information in relation to him personally should, no longer be linked to his name by a list of results 
displayed following a search made on the basis of his name, without it being necessary in order to 
find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in that list causes prejudice to the 
data subject. As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter, (right to the respect for private life, and the right to the protection of personal data) 
request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public on 
account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic 
interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having 
access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. However, that would 
not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in 
public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest 
of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the 
information in question. 
 
In contrast with the general perception that has been created about this case, the judgment of the 
CJEU in the Google Spain case does not recognise nor mention a “right to be forgotten”, neither in 
general terms, nor in relation to the application of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC of 
24 October 1995.  
 
Although the CJEU recognises that there may be circumstances (“particular reasons”) in which 
exceptionally the remaining of the public accessibility of personal data can be justified “by the 
preponderant interest of the general public”, it is remarkable that the judgment omits to refer to the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to receive information as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf.  See also http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-
material/press-release/art29_press_material/20141126_wp29_press_release_ecj_de-listing.pdf  and 
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/11/28/google-spain-article-29-working-party-issues-guidelines-for-de-
listing-decisions/ 
and Article 11 EU Charter. In practice however, the impact of the de-listing on individuals’ rights to 
freedom of expression and access to information will prove to be very limited, according to the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, referring to the public’s the right to information: “When 
assessing the relevant circumstances, European Data Protection Authorities (hereinafter: DPAs) will 
systematically take into account the interest of the public in having access to the information. If the 
interest of the public overrides the rights of the data subject, de-listing will not be appropriate. The 
judgment states that the right only affects the results obtained from searches made on the basis of a 
person’s name and does not require deletion of the link from the indexes of the search engine 
altogether. That is, the original information will still be accessible using other search terms, or by 
direct access to the publisher’s original source”.20 
 
- CJEU 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Case C-293/12 (Grand Chamber) on data retention and 
the fight against organized crime and terrorism 
Another important CJEU judgment dealing with data protection is indeed to be mentioned, although 
finally in the case C-293/12 of Digital Rights Ireland Ltd regarding the EU Data Retention Directive, 
the CJEU considered that there was no need to examine the validity of the Data Retention Directive 
in the light of the right to freedom of expression and information under Article 11 of the EU-Charter 
and Article 10 ECHR.21 Having regard to other considerations, the CJEU held that, by adopting 
Directive 2006/24, the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the 
principle of proportionality in the light of the right of privacy and protection of personal data under 
Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU-Charter. The CJEU decided most importantly: “As regards the 
necessity for the retention of data required by Directive 2006/24, it must be held that the fight 
against serious crime, in particular against organised crime and terrorism, is indeed of the utmost 
importance in order to ensure public security and its effectiveness may depend to a great extent on 
the use of modern investigation techniques. However, such an objective of general interest, however 
fundamental it may be, does not, in itself, justify a retention measure such as that established by 
Directive 2006/24 being considered to be necessary for the purpose of that fight”.  According to the 
CJEU the EU legislation in question must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and 
application of the measure in question and imposing minimum safeguards so that the persons whose 
data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to effectively protect their personal data against 
the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that data. The need for such safeguards 
is all the greater where, as laid down in Directive 2006/24, personal data are subjected to automatic 
processing and where there is a significant risk of unlawful access to those data. Because the 
Directive 2006/24 is considered being overbroad and is lacking substantive, procedural and other 
safeguards in the light of the right of privacy and data protection,  it is considered not laying down 
clear and precise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. The CJEU holds therefore that Directive 2006/24 entails a 
                                                           
20 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines of 26 November 2014,  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf.   
21 CJEU 8 April 2014, Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, 
Ireland, Requests for a preliminary ruling concerning the validity of Directive 2006/24/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications 
networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. 
wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the legal order of 
the EU, without such an interference being precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is 
actually limited to what is strictly necessary. Therefore the CJEU ruled that Directive 2006/24/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC is invalid. 
Case related to the EU E-commerce Directive and the limited liability of intermediary service 
providers on the internet 
 
- CJEU 11 September 2014, Sotiris Papasavvas v O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia Ltd, Takis Kounnafi, 
Giorgos Sertis,  Case C-291: the limitations of civil liability for ISP’s do not apply for a newspaper’s 
online version 
The request for a preliminary ruling in this case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2000/31/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (E-commerce Directive). 
The questions focus mainly on the applicability of the limitations for liability of ISP’s, as mere conduit, 
caching or hosting providers. In essence, ISP’s (or: intermediary service providers), cannot be held 
liable for content they transmit or store on their network when the ISP has neither knowledge, nor 
control over the information which is transmitted or stored. The CJEU reiterates that “the 
exemptions from liability established in the E-commerce directive cover only cases in which the 
activity of the information society service provider is of a merely technical, automatic and passive 
nature, which implies that that service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the 
information which is transmitted or stored”. This means that online newspapers cannot invoke the 
limited liability that is applicable for ISP’s, as the newspaper itself publishes its content online, being 
aware of this content. 
The case relates to the proceedings between Mr Papasavvas, on the one hand, and O Fileleftheros 
Dimosia Etairia Ltd, Mr Kounnafi and Mr Sertis, on the other, concerning an action for damages 
brought by Mr Papasavvas as a result of harm suffered by him caused by acts considered to 
constitute defamation. Mr Papasavvas brought an action for damages before the Eparchiako 
Dikastirio Lefkosias in Cyprus against O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etaireia Ltd, a newspaper company, and 
against Mr Kounnafi, Editor-in-Chief and journalist at O Fileleftheros, and Mr Sertis, journalist at that 
newspaper, for acts which, in his opinion, constitute defamation.  Mr Papasavvas seeks damages for 
harm allegedly caused to him by articles published in the daily national newspaper O Fileleftheros, on 
7 November 2010, which were published online on two websites (http://www.philenews.com and 
http://www.phileftheros.com). He requests also the national court to order a prohibitory injunction 
to prohibit the publication of the contested articles.  
As the court in Cyprus considers that the resolution of the case pending before it depends in part on 
the interpretation of Directive 2000/31, it decided to refer a series of questions to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. 
In essence the CJEU clarifies that since a newspaper publishing company which posts an online 
version of a newspaper on its website has, in principle, knowledge about the information which it 
posts and exercises control over that information, it cannot be considered to be an ‘intermediary 
service provider’ within the meaning of Articles 12 to 14 of Directive 2000/31, whether or not access 
to that website is free of charge. Therefore the limitations of civil liability specified in Articles 12 to 14 
of Directive 2000/31 do not apply to the case of a newspaper publishing company which operates a 
website on which the online version of a newspaper is posted, that company being, moreover, 
remunerated by income generated by commercial advertisements posted on that website, since it 
has knowledge of the information posted and exercises control over that information, whether or 
not access to that website is free of charge.   
The CJEU also decides that Articles 12 to 14 of the E-commerce Directive 2000/31 do not allow 
information society service providers to oppose the bringing of legal proceedings for civil liability 
against them and, consequently, the adoption of a prohibitory injunction by a national court. The 
limitations of liability provided for in those articles may be invoked by the provider in accordance 
with the provisions of national law transposing the Articles 12 to 14 of the Directive or, failing that, 
for the purpose of an interpretation of that law in conformity with the directive. Since the service 
providers at issue in the main proceedings do not appear capable of being considered to be 
intermediary service providers referred to by Articles 12 to 14 of Directive 2000/31, they cannot rely 
on this provisions. 
Cases related to IP, copyright law and freedom of expression and information 
 
- CJEU 13 February 2014, Nils Svensson a.o. v. Retriever Sverige AB, C-466/12:  “Clickable links” to 
works freely available on another website are no breach of copyright (no new public, no 
communication to the public under Infosoc Directive 2001/29). 
Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, must be interpreted as meaning that the 
provision on a website of clickable links to works freely available on another website does not 
constitute an “act of communication to the public”, as referred to in that provision. The objective 
pursued by Directive 2001/29 would inevitably be undermined if the concept of communication to 
the public were to be construed in different Member States as including a wider range of activities 
than those referred to in Article 3(1) of that directive. The CJEU observes that indeed an act of 
communication such as that made by a manager of a website by means of clickable link is aimed at 
all potential users of the site, that is to say, an indeterminate and fairly large number of recipients. 
But it does not lead to the works in question being communicated to a new public, as the public 
targeted by the initial communication already consisted of all potential visitors to the site concerned. 
Given that access to the works on that site was not subject to any restrictive measures, all Internet 
users could therefore have free access to them. It is obvious that by excluding “clickable links” as 
those at issue from copyright protection, the interpretation of the CJEU of what constitutes an act of 
communication to the public has, support guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression and 
information in the online environment. The CJEU however does not refer to Article 11 of the EU-
Charter or Article 10 ECHR, and it argues that if the Member States were to be afforded the 
possibility of laying down that the concept of communication to the public includes a wider range of 
activities than those referred to in Article 3 (1) of the directive, “the functioning of the internal 
market would be bound to be adversely affected”. 
 
Notice that the CJEU’s judgment does not clarify what the status of a “clickable link” is in terms of 
copyright protection, from the moment that the initial communication that was first freely 
accessible, has become subject after the “clickable link” was posted, to restrictive measures at the 
level of the initial communication on the internet. 
- CJEU 27 March 2014, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, Wega 
Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH, C-314/12: ISP restricting access in order to protect copyright 
must ensure compliance with the fundamental right of internet users to freedom of information.  
The CJEU has clarified in this preliminary ruling that an ISP restricting access to protect copyright 
must ensure compliance with the fundamental right of internet users to freedom of information. 
Measures shall not affect internet users lawfully accessing information. National procedural rules 
must provide a possibility for internet users to assert their rights before the court once the 
implementing measures taken by an internet service provider are known. Failing that, the provider’s 
interference in the freedom of information of those users would be unjustified in the light of the 
objective pursued. 
Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society (Infosoc Directive) provides for the possibility for right holders to 
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe one 
of their rights. it must be held that an internet service provider, which allows its customers to access 
protected subject-matter made available to the public on the internet by a third party is an 
intermediary whose services are used to infringe a copyright or related right within the meaning of 
Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29. Directive 2001/29 requires that the measures which the Member 
States must take in order to conform to that directive are aimed not only at bringing to an end 
infringements of copyright and of related rights, but also at preventing them. The Court has already 
ruled that, where several fundamental rights are at issue, the Member States must, when 
transposing a directive, ensure that they rely on an interpretation of the directive which allows a fair 
balance to be struck between the applicable fundamental rights protected by the European Union 
legal order. Then, when implementing the measures transposing that directive, the authorities and 
courts of the Member States must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with 
that directive but also ensure that they do not rely on an interpretation of it which would be in 
conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other general principles of EU law, such as the 
principle of proportionality. In the present case, it must be observed that an injunction such as that 
at issue in the main proceedings, taken on the basis of Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29, makes it 
necessary to strike a balance, primarily, between (i) copyrights and related rights, which are 
intellectual property and are therefore protected under Article 17(2) of the Charter, (ii) the freedom 
to conduct a business, which economic agents such as internet service providers enjoy under Article 
16 of the Charter, and (iii) the freedom of information of internet users, whose protection is ensured 
by Article 11 of the Charter. When the addressee of an injunction chooses the measures to be 
adopted in order to comply with that injunction, he must ensure compliance with the fundamental 
right of internet users to freedom of information. In this respect, the measures adopted by the 
internet service provider must be strictly targeted, in the sense that they must serve to bring an end 
to a third party’s infringement of copyright or of a related right but without thereby affecting 
internet users who are using the provider’s services in order to lawfully access information. Failing 
that, the provider’s interference in the freedom of information of those users would be unjustified in 
the light of the objective pursued. It must be possible for national courts to check that that is the 
case. In the case of an injunction  such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the Court notes that, 
if the internet service provider adopts measures which enable it to achieve the required prohibition, 
the national courts will not be able to carry out such a review at the stage of the enforcement 
proceedings if there is no challenge in that regard. Accordingly, in order to prevent the fundamental 
rights recognised by EU law from precluding the adoption of an injunction such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings, the national procedural rules must provide a possibility for internet users to assert 
their rights before the court once the implementing measures taken by the internet service provider 
are known. 
 
- CJEU 10 April 2014, ACI Adam BV and Others v. Stichting de Thuiskopie, Stichting 
Onderhandelingen Thuiskopie vergoeding, C-435/12: reproduction for private use is allowed, but 
not if the copies are made from an unlawful source – for the calculation of the fair compensation 
to right holders, a copying levy system must make a distinction between reproduction from a 
lawful source and from an unlawful source 
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 5(2)(b) and (5) of Directive 
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, and of Directive 
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. The request has been made in proceedings between, on the one hand, 
ACI Adam BV and a certain number of other undertakings (‘ACI Adam and Others’) and, on the other, 
Stichting de Thuiskopie (‘Thuiskopie’) and Stichting Onderhandelingen Thuiskopie vergoeding 
(‘SONT’) — two foundations responsible for, first, collecting and distributing the levy imposed on 
manufacturers and importers of media designed for the reproduction of literary, scientific or artistic 
works with a view to private use (‘the private copying levy’), and, secondly, determining the amount 
of that levy — regarding the fact that SONT, in determining the amount of that levy, takes into 
account the harm resulting from copies made from an unlawful source. 
 
In essence the CJEU made clear that the restrictions and limitation on copyright giving certain rights 
to users of works do not apply for reproductions for private use made from an unlawful source. 
 
The CJEU states:  
“35 If the Member States had the option of adopting legislation which also allowed reproductions for 
private use to be made from an unlawful source, the result of that would clearly be detrimental to the 
proper functioning of the internal market. 
36 Secondly, it is apparent from recital 22 in the preamble to Directive 2001/29, that the objective of 
proper support for the dissemination of culture must not be achieved by sacrificing strict protection of 
rights or by tolerating illegal forms of distribution of counterfeited or pirated works. 
37 Consequently, national legislation which makes no distinction between private copies made from 
lawful sources and those made from counterfeited or pirated sources cannot be tolerated. 
38 Furthermore, when it is applied, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, 
which does not draw a distinction according to whether the source from which a reproduction for 
private use is made is lawful or unlawful, may infringe certain conditions laid down by Article 5(5) of 
Directive 2001/29. 
39 First, to accept that such reproductions may be made from an unlawful source would encourage 
the circulation of counterfeited or pirated works, thus inevitably reducing the volume of sales or of 
other lawful transactions relating to the protected works, with the result that a normal exploitation of 
those works would be adversely affected. 
40 Secondly, the application of such national legislation may, having regard to the finding made in 
paragraph 31 of the present judgment, unreasonably prejudice copyright holders. 
41 It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 must be 
interpreted as not covering the case of private copies made from an unlawful source”. 
The CJEU also decides that a copying levy system, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, 
which does not, as regards the calculation of the fair compensation payable to its recipients, 
distinguish the situation in which the source from which a reproduction for private use has been 
made is lawful from that in which that source is unlawful, does not respect the fair balance between 
the rights and interests of authors, who are the recipients of the fair compensation, on the one hand, 
and those of users of protected subject-matter, on the other. As a consequence this precludes 
national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which does not distinguish the 
situation in which the source from which a reproduction for private use is made is lawful from that in 
which that source is unlawful. 
The CJEU also reiterates that the provisions in the Directive 2001/20 that refer to the exceptions and 
limitations on copyright and related rights, derogate from a general principle established by that 
directive and therefore must be interpreted strictly. It follows that the different exceptions and 
limitations provided for in the case at issue (Article 5(2) of Directive 2001/29) must be interpreted 
strictly. It is obvious that together with the Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29 that requires that the 
exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right are to be applied only in certain special cases 
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder, this strict interpretation of the 
exceptions and limitations on copyright and related rights may obstruct the fair balance which must 
reached between the rights and interests of authors, on the one hand, and those of users of works, 
on the other hand. 
- CJEU 3 September 2014, Vandersteen v. Deckmyn, C-201/13 (Grand Chamber): preliminary ruling 
in Belgian Parody Case (Spike and Suzy) – parody as a format of freedom of expression, delimiting 
the rights of copyright holders 
This cases concerns the parody as a format of freedom of expression and the balancing enforcement 
of copyright conflicting with the right to freedom of expression. The CJEU introduces a broad concept 
of parody, that can limit copyright claims in cases of “transformative use” of copyright protected 
works. Still copyright holders can eventually oppose against a parody, if the parody contains a 
discriminatory message they do not want to be associated with. 
A pending case in Belgium on parody contains many ingredients, including an interesting aspect with 
regard the relation between copyright and freedom of expression. The case concerns a small 
calendar, less than 6 by 9 centimeters, distributed in January 2011 by the radical right-wing political 
party Vlaams Belang, representing one of the Spike and Suzy comic book’s main characters, Ambrose 
(Lambik), wearing a white tunic and throwing coins to people who are trying to pick them up. The 
calendar resembles the cover of an original Spike and Suzy album, “De Wilde Weldoener”, roughly to 
be translated as “The Compulsive Benefactor”. In the drawing at issue, the character of Ambrose is 
replaced by the Mayor of the City of Ghent. The people picking up the coins are replaced by people 
wearing veils and people of colour. The President of the Court of First Instance in Brussels, on 
request of the copyright holders ordered an injunction and rejected the parody defense by the 
Vlaams Belang, in essence because of lack of originality and because the parody did not criticize the 
work of Willy Vandersteen, but targeted the policy by the Mayor of Ghent. The Court of Appeal in 
Brussels showed reluctance how to decide the case and asked for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU in 
order to give some guidance how to apply the parody exception in the framework of EU copyright 
law. 
 
It is interesting to notice that the CJEU draws the attention on the conflicting rights at issue,  
considering that “the application, in a particular case, of the exception for parody, within the 
meaning of Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29, must strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, 
the interests and rights of persons referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of that directive (reproduction right 
and right of communication to the public), and, on the other, the freedom of expression of the user 
of a protected work who is relying on the exception for parody, within the meaning of Article 
5(3)(k)”. This approach of balancing copyright with the right to freedom of expression can also be 
found in the recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights.22   
The judgment of the CJEU of 3 September 2014 opts for a broad, even a very broad definition of 
what can consist a parody and hence extends the range and application of the parody exception. 
Indeed in some EU member states, and especially in Belgium, the parody concept was given a much 
narrower interpretation as compared to the new established European standard.23 
The CJEU decides that  “the essential characteristics of parody are, first, to evoke an existing work 
while being noticeably different from it, and, secondly, to constitute an expression of humour or 
mockery”. These are actually the only two relevant and pertinent characteristics, as all other criteria 
or conditions formulated by the Brussels Court of Appeal in its request for a preliminary ruling are 
irrelevant, according to the CJEU. The CJEU is very decisive and clear : “The concept of ‘parody’ (..) , is 
not subject to the conditions that the parody should display an original character of its own, other 
than that of displaying noticeable differences with respect to the original parodied work; that it could 
reasonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the original work itself; that it should 
relate to the original work itself or mention the source of the parodied work”. This also implies that 
both the parody ‘on’ and the parody ‘with’ are covered by the EU parody exception: a parody does 
not need to criticize or be directly in contrast or in a dialogue with the original work, as it does not 
need “to relate to the original work itself”. The CJEU opts for a wide and flexible parody concept, 
emphasizing that the concept of parody must be broad enough to “enable the effectiveness” of that 
exception and to safeguard its purpose. The CJEU considers that it “is not disputed that parody is an 
                                                           
22
 See also our blogs on the Ashby Donald and “The Pirate Bay” case: D. Voorhoof and I. Høedt-Rasmussen, 
“Copyright vs. Freedom of Expression”, http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/01/26/case-law-court-of-human-
rights-ashby-donald-v-france-copyright-versus-freedom-expression-dirk-voorhoof-and-inger-hoedt-
rasmussen/#more-19417 and “Copyright vs. Freedom of Expression II (The Pirate Bay)”, 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/03/22/case-law-court-of-human-rights-the-pirate-bay-v-sweden-copyright-
versus-freedom-of-expression-ii-dirk-voorhoof-and-inger-hoedt-rasmussen/#more-20411. For a more extensive 
and recent analysis, see D. Voorhoof, “Freedom of expression and the right to information: Implications for 
copyright”, in C. GEIGER (ed.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Cheltenham-
Northampton: Edward Elgar), 2015, 331-353. 
23
 See also D. Mendis and M. Kretschmer, The Treatment of Parodies under Copyright Law in Seven 
Jurisdictions (Intellectual Property Office, 2013), at www.ipo.gov.uk. 
appropriate way to express an opinion”, and that the envisaged EU-harmonisation of copyright right 
and related rights in the information society, can only be reached in “observance of the fundamental 
principles of law and especially of property, including intellectual property, and freedom of 
expression and the public interest.”  
Therefore it is necessary but sufficient that a parody “evokes” an existing work being noticeably 
different from it and that it constitutes an expression of “humour or mockery”. It means that the 
national judges in the EU-Member states can only apply these two criteria in determining whether or 
not the parody-exception as mentioned  in Article 5(3)(k) of the Infosoc Directive 2001/29, and 
implemented in their national law, can be invoked. It is to be observed that the interpretation 
whether a parody expresses “humour or mockery” should  be approached with due care, the courts 
or judges in this context becoming the jury of what humour or mockery is (and is not). For sure, there 
is no autonomous concept of EU law what humour or mockery is, while the “humour or mockery”-
criteria are ultimately and decisively the criteria to determine whether a parody fits in the 
autonomous concept of parody in EU law. There at least fifty shades of humour and mockery… 
Even if the Vlaams Blok calendar is to be considered as a parody, the CJEU clarifies that the right 
holders still have, in principle, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the work protected by copyright 
is not associated with a discriminatory message. The result of this approach risks to compromise the 
“fair balance” between the rights of the copyright holders and the right to freedom of artistic or 
political expression by the users of the copyright protected work. The CJEU explicitly refers to the EU 
instruments that can eventually justify an interference in the right to freedom of expression on the 
basis of combatting discrimination (the Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 and Article 
21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), but no longer refers in this 
regard to Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights or Article 10 ECHR. 
By leaving wide open the possibility for right holders to oppose against a parody they dislike to be 
associated with, the approach of the CJEU also risks to compromise the aim and ratio of the parody 
exception. The essence of the parody exception is precisely to legitimise a transformative use of an 
original work without permission of the right holder, as in principle copyright holders are not to be 
expected to authorise spontaneously the transformative use of their original work. If copyright 
holders can oppose the making of transformative works they do not want to be associated with, not 
much will be left of the parody exception, albeit it a broad concept in the terms of a harmonised 
concept of EU law. In this specific case however there is the circumstance that the right holders do 
not want to be associated with what they consider a discriminatory message or “hate speech”. 
It is now up to national courts, and if need be the European Court of Human Rights in a later stage, to 
clarify whether the application of a copyright claim clearly interfering with the right to freedom of 
expression an information, can be sufficiently justified as necessary in a democratic society.  As the 
CJEU’s judgment is “only” a preliminary ruling, the final outcome of the case at hand is still uncertain. 
The circumstance that right holders have, in principle, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the work 
protected by copyright is not associated with a discriminatory message, does not mean that this is a 
sufficiently pertinent argument in this case to put aside the parody exception and to interfere with 
the freedom of political expression of the parodist.  
Yet, the judgment of the CJEU has undoubtedly clarified that the parody exception is to be applied as 
a very broad concept in European law. This also obliges the EU member states to interpret the 
parody exception, in as far as it is provided in their national copyright legislation, accordingly. EU 
member states who have not integrated a parody exception yet in their copyright law will now be 
inclined to do so. As according to the CJEU a “fair balance” must be struck between the rights and 
interests of the right holders of an original work and the freedom of expression of the user of a 
protected work who is relying on the exception for parody, within the meaning of Article 5(3)(k), it is 
hard to imagine how such a fair balance can be reached if the national law does not provide in a 
copyright exception for parody at all. This also confirms that the other optional restrictions or 
limitations on copyright law as listed in the Infosoc Directive 2001/29, that are directly or indirectly 
based on the right to freedom of expression and information, should be made mandatory. 
 
- CJEU 11 September 2014, Technische Universität Darmstadt v. Eugen Ulmer KG, C-117/13: the 
right of libraries to digitise a work contained in its collection in order to make it available to users 
by dedicated terminals and the limitation of copyright by the publisher of this work. 
The request for a preliminary ruling was made in proceedings between the Technical University of 
Darmstadt (Technische Universität Darmstadt, ‘TU Darmstadt’) and Eugen Ulmer KG (‘Ulmer’), 
concerning TU Darmstadt’s making available to the public, by terminals installed within a library, of a 
book contained in its collection, the user rights to which are held by Ulmer. 
 
In essence the CJEU had to clarify the scope of one of the (optional) restrictions in European 
Copyright Law, based on Article 5 (3) (n) of Directive 2001/29/EC, Copyright and related rights in the 
information society, permitting the use by communication or making available, for the purpose of 
research or private study, to individual members of the public by dedicated terminals on the 
premises of establishments referred to in paragraph 2(c) of works and other subject-matter not 
subject to purchase or licensing terms which are contained in their collections. The establishments at 
issue are publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments or museums, or archives, which are 
not for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage. 
The publisher, Ulmer, argues that the mere fact that the right holder offers to conclude a licensing 
agreement with a publicly accessible library is sufficient for ruling out the application of Article 
5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29, provided always that such offer is ‘appropriate’. The CJEU recalls that 
the limitation under Article 5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29 aims to promote the public interest in 
promoting research and private study, through the dissemination of knowledge, which constitutes, 
moreover, the core mission of publicly accessible libraries. The CJEU takes the view that the 
interpretation favoured by Ulmer implies that the right holder could, by means of a unilateral and 
essentially discretionary action, deny the establishment concerned the right to benefit from that 
limitation and thereby prevent it from realising its core mission and promoting the public interest. It 
emphasises that the interpretation proposed by Ulmer is difficult to reconcile with the aim pursued 
by Article 5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29, which is to maintain a fair balance between the rights and 
interests of right holders, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, users of protected works who 
wish to communicate them to the public for the purpose of research or private study undertaken by 
individual members of the public. Therefore, the concept of ‘purchase or licensing terms’ provided 
for in Article 5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29 must be understood as requiring that the right holder and 
an establishment, such as a publicly accessible library, referred to in that provision must have 
concluded a licensing agreement in respect of the work in question that sets out the conditions in 
which that establishment may use that work. 
The CJEU also clarifies the right of communication of works enjoyed by establishments such as 
publicly accessible libraries covered by Article 5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29, within the limits of the 
conditions provided for by that provision, would risk being rendered largely meaningless, or indeed 
ineffective, if those establishments did not also have an ancillary right to digitise the works in 
question. It means that Article 5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29, read in conjunction with Article 5(2)(c) of 
that directive, must be interpreted to mean that it does not preclude Member States from granting 
to publicly accessible libraries covered by those provisions the right to digitise the works contained in 
their collections, if such act of reproduction is necessary for the purpose of making those works 
available to users, by means of dedicated terminals, within those establishments.  
The CJEU also rules that Article 5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted to mean that it does 
not extend to acts such as the printing out of works on paper or their storage on a USB stick, carried 
out by users from dedicated terminals installed in publicly accessible libraries covered by that 
provision. However, such acts may, if appropriate, be authorised under national legislation 
transposing the exceptions or limitations provided for in Article 5(2)(a) or (b) of that directive 
provided that, in each individual case, the conditions laid down by those provisions are met. 
Also this CJEU-judgment is a good illustration of the application of Recital 31 of Directive 2001/39, 
which states that “a fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories of right 
holders, as well as between the different categories of right holders and users of protected subject-
matter must be safeguarded”, as the CJEU clearly balanced the interest of the copyright holders on 
their works with the interest of the users of these work. 
2. Regional influences – influences beyond the regions? 
Cf. supra 
3. Cross-references to other jurisdictions/other international instruments? 
Cf. supra 
 
4. Is the ECtHR (still) a progressive judicial actor as regards the right to 
freedom of expression and information? 
The overview of the Strasbourg Court’s case law showed that in many cases a violation of Article 10 
ECHR has been found, hence the European Court imposing and requesting a higher level of 
protection of the right to freedom of expression and information than the level guaranteed at the 
domestic level of the defending states. It is obvious that in cases of access to public documents, 
whistleblowing, defamation of public persons and criminal convictions of journalist or publishers, the 
Article 10 case law of the Strasbourg Court secures a higher and more robust level of protection. Also 
the list of violations found in cases against Turkey and against Russia in 2014 illustrates the efforts 
that are to made in both countries in order to effectively respect the ECHR as a legal binding 
instrument of human rights protection within their respective jurisdictions.  
In some cases in which the Court did not conclude to the finding of a violation of Article 10 ECHR, 
pertinent and convincing reasons seemed to be available for the ECtHR in order to consider the 
impugned interferences as complying with Article 10 § 2 ECHR, and hence being necessary in a 
democratic society. A few judgments were more controversial or neglected to some extend the 
interest of having the right to freedom of expression also secured in religious matters (Fernández 
Martínez v. Spain and S.A.S. France). 
Yet, in a few judgments the Court found no violation of Article 10 ECHR, while the justification to 
consider the interferences with the right to freedom of expression and information at issue does not 
seem convincing, lacking consistency with the Court’s earlier case law. Some of these judgments in 
the meantime have been referred to the Grand Chamber, such as Morice v. France, Pentikäinen v. 
Finland and Delfi AS v. Estonia (cf. infra).  
 
Especially two judgments that became final, seem to neglect the importance of the right to freedom 
of expression in a democratic society. 
 
- ECtHR 16 January 2014, Tierbefreier E.V. v. Germany, Appl. No. 45192/09: injunction against use 
of footages secretly taken by journalist is no violation of Art. 10 
Tierbefreier e.V. is an association based in Germany which militates for animal rights. A court 
decision prevented the association from disseminating a film footage which was secretly taken by a 
journalist on the premises of a company performing experiments on animals for the pharmaceutical 
industry (C. company). The journalist used his footage to produce documentary films of different 
length, critically commenting the way laboratory animals were treated. His films or extracts of it were 
shown on different TV channels. Largely based on the journalist’s footages, Tierbefreier produced a 
film of about 20 minutes, with the title “Poisoning for profit” and made it available on its website. 
The film contained the accusation that the legal regulations on the treatment of animals were 
disregarded by C. company and closed by the statement that medicines were not being made safer 
by poisoning monkeys. On request of C. company, relying on its personality rights, which 
encompassed the right not to be spied upon by use of hidden cameras, Tierbefreier was ordered by a 
court injunction to desist from publicly showing the film footage taken by the journalist on the C. 
company’s premises or to make it otherwise available to third persons. According to the German 
courts Tierbefreier could not rely on its right to freedom of expression, as the manner in which it had 
presented the footages did not respect the rules of intellectual battle of ideas. Relying on Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights Tierbefreier lodged an appeal before the Strasbourg 
Court, complaining that the injunction had violated its right to freedom of expression. The 
association further relied on Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction with Article 10, 
complaining that it had been discriminated against in comparison with the journalist and other 
animal rights activists who had merely been prohibited from disseminating specific films, but had 
been allowed to continue the publication of the footage in other contexts. 
The European Court endorses the assessment that the injunction interfered with Tierbefreier’s right 
to freedom of expression. But as it was prescribed by law, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting 
the C. company’s reputation and was considered “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court 
found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court observed that the domestic courts 
carefully examined whether to grant the injunction in question would violate the applicant 
association’s right to freedom of expression, fully acknowledging the impact of the right to freedom 
of expression in a debate on matters of public interest. The Court points out that there was no 
evidence however that the accusations made in the film “Poisoning for profit”, according to which 
the C. company systematically flouted the law, were correct. Furthermore, Tierbefreier had 
employed unfair means when militating against the C. company’s activities and they could be 
expected to continue to do so if allowed to make further use of the footage. The Court also referred 
to the German courts findings that the further dissemination of the footage would seriously violate 
the C. company’s rights,  especially since the footage had been produced by a former employee of 
the C. company, who had abused his professional status in order secretly to produce film material 
within that company’s private premises. The Court finally notes that the interference at issue did not 
concern any criminal sanctions, but a civil injunction preventing Tierbefreier from disseminating 
specified footage. It referred to the circumstance that Tierbefreier remained fully entitled to express 
its criticism on animal experiments in other, even one-sided ways. The Court considers that the 
German courts struck a fair balance between Tierbefreier’s right to freedom of expression and the C. 
company’s interests in protecting its reputation. Hence there hasn’t been a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention taken separately. As the German courts also gave relevant reasons for treating 
Tierbefreier differently from the other animal rights activists and the journalist with regard to the 
extent of the civil injunction, the European Court accordingly finds neither a violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention. 
- ECtHR 29 April 2014, Salumäki v. Finland, Appl. No. 23605/09: innuendo of involvement in  
homicide case justifies criminal conviction 
Can a title of a newspaper article that could be interpreted as damaging the reputation of a public 
person justify a criminal conviction of the journalist who wrote the article, while the article itself is 
written in good faith and  does not contain any factual errors or defamatory allegations? That is the 
question the European Court needed to answer in a recent case against Finland. The applicant in this 
case is Tiina Johanna Salumäki, a journalist working for the newspaper Ilta-Sanomat. Ms Salumäki 
published an article concerning the investigation into a homicide (of P.O.). The front page of the 
newspaper carried a headline asking whether the victim of the homicide had connections with K.U., a 
well-known Finnish businessman. A photograph of K.U. appeared on the same page. Next to the 
article was a separate column mentioning K.U.’s previous conviction for economic crimes. The 
Helsinki District Court convicted the journalist, Salumäki, and the newspaper’s editor-in-chief at the 
time, H.S., of defaming K.U. as the title of their article insinuated that K.U. had been involved in the 
killing, even though it was made clear in the text of the article itself that the homicide suspect had no 
connections with K.U. Along with H.S., Salumäki was ordered to pay damages and costs to K.U. This 
judgment was subsequently upheld on appeal and the Supreme Court finally refused leave to appeal. 
Salumäki complained that her conviction had amounted to a violation of Article 10 (freedom of 
expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. She argued that the information 
presented in the article was correct and that the title of the article only connected K.U. to the victim 
and did not insinuate that K.U. had connections with the perpetrator, neither that he was involved in 
the homicide. 
The Court explains that it had to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance when 
protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in 
certain cases, namely, on the one hand, the freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and, on 
the other, the right to respect for private life, including the right of reputation, enshrined in Article 8. 
The Court applies the criteria developed by the Grand Chamber in Axel Springer Verlag and Von 
Hannover (no. 2) (Iris 2012/3-1) in order to find out whether the domestic authorities struck indeed a 
fair balance between the rights protected by Article 8 and 10 of the Convention. First the Court 
emphasises that the criminal investigation into a homicide was clearly a matter of legitimate public 
interest, having regard in particular to the serious nature of the crime : “From the point of view of 
the general public’s right to receive information about matters of public interest, and thus from the 
standpoint of the press, there were justified grounds for reporting the matter to the public”.  The 
Court also recognised that “the article was based on information given by the authorities and K.U.’s 
photograph had been taken at a public event”, while “the facts set out in the article in issue were not 
in dispute even before the domestic courts. There is no evidence, or indeed any allegation, of factual 
errors, misrepresentation or bad faith on the part of the applicant”. Nevertheless the decisive factor 
in this case was that according to the domestic courts, the title created a connection between K.U. 
and the homicide, implying that he was involved in it. Even though it was specifically stated in the 
text of the article that the homicide suspect had no connections with K.U., this information only 
appeared towards the end of the article. The Court is of the opinion that Salumäki must have 
considered it probable that her article contained a false insinuation and that this false insinuation 
was capable of causing suffering to K.U. The Court refers in this context also to the principle of 
presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention and emphasises that this principle 
may be relevant also in Article 10 contexts in situations in which nothing is clearly stated but only 
insinuated. The Court therefore comes to the conclusion that what the journalist had written was 
defamatory, implying that K.U. was somehow responsible for P.O.’s murder. According to the Court, 
“it amounted to stating, by innuendo, a fact which was highly damaging to the reputation of K.U.” 
and at no time did Salumäki attempt to prove the truth of the insinuated fact, nor did she plead that 
the insinuation was a fair comment based on relevant facts. Having regard to all the foregoing 
factors, including the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this area, the Court considers 
that the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. There has 
therefore been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
Other examples of judgments and a decision which seem not fully in line with the high threshold of 
protection of freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR: 
 
- ECtHR 30 January 2014, De Lesquen du Plessis-Casso v. France (no. 2), Appl. No. 34400/10  
This case is about the defamation of a politician and the criminal conviction for posting a letter on 
the Internet criticizing the political opportunism of a mayor in France. In  September  2006, in 
response to an invitation from E.P., mayor of Versailles and member of parliament, to a ceremony to 
pay tribute to the “harkis” (French army auxiliaries during the Algerian war), Mr Plessis-Casso, a town 
councillor of Versailles, sent him an open letter that was published on the Internet. On the basis of 
comments attributed to an “eminent figure of Versailles”, he accused E.P. of, among other things, 
having waited until the end of the war to request French nationality, in order to avoid military service 
in Algeria. The European Court, confirming the findings of the French courts, is of the opinion that 
this value judgment had no sufficient factual basis, while Plessis-Casso had neither seriously verified 
in advance the truthfulness of the allegation against E.P. The Court also takes into account the 
serious character of the allegation, that also touched upon the private life of E.P. and it referred to 
the well prepared and conscious attack by Plessis-Casso on the reputation of E.P. Also finding the 
conviction in the form of a fine (1500 euro) combined with an award of damages (2000 euro) 
proportionate , the Court concludes that there is no violation of Article 10 ECHR (dissenting opinion 
by Judge Power-Forde). 
 
- ECtHR  28 October 2014, Gough v. UK, Appl. No.  49327/11  
In this case of the so-called “naked rambler”, the applicant complained about his repeated arrest, 
prosecution, conviction and imprisonment for the offence of breach of the peace owing to his refusal 
to wear clothes. The Court agrees that the applicant’s public nudity can be seen as a form of 
expression which falls within the ambit of Article 10 of the Convention and that his arrest, 
prosecution, conviction and detention constituted repressive measures taken in reaction to that form 
of expression of his opinions by the applicant. There has therefore been an interference with his 
exercise of his right to freedom of expression. The Court however agrees with the national 
authorities’ findings that the applicant’s appearance naked in public places and public roads was 
sufficiently severe to cause alarm to ordinary people and serious disturbance to the community. The 
Court is of the view that it is not concerned with the respondent State’s response to an individual 
incident of public nudity but with its response to the applicant’s persistent public nudity and his 
wilful and contumacious refusal to obey the law over a number of years. According to the Court the 
applicant’s own responsibility for the convictions and the sentences imposed cannot be ignored. It 
emphasises that in exercising his right to freedom of expression, the applicant was in principle under 
a general duty to respect the country’s laws and to pursue his desire to bring about legislative or 
societal change in accordance with them. Also many other avenues for the expression of his opinion 
on nudity or for initiating a public debate on the subject were open to the applicant. The Court also 
states: “Without any demonstration of sensibility to the views of others and the behaviour that they 
might consider offensive, he insists upon his right to appear naked at all times and in all places, 
including in the courts, in the communal areas of prisons and on aeroplanes”.  The Court admits that 
the applicant’s case is troubling, since his intransigence has led to his spending a substantial period of 
time in prison for what is – in itself – usually a relatively trivial offence. However, the applicant’s 
imprisonment is the consequence of his repeated violation of the criminal law in full knowledge of 
the consequences, through conduct which he knew full well not only goes against the standards of 
accepted public behaviour in any modern democratic society but also is liable to be alarming and 
morally and otherwise offensive to other, unwarned members of the public going about their 
ordinary business. Therefore the Court concludes unanismously : “Even though, cumulatively, the 
penalties imposed on the applicant undoubtedly did entail serious consequences for him, the Court 
cannot find in the circumstances of his case, having regard in particular to his own responsibility for 
his plight, that the public authorities in Scotland unjustifiably interfered with his exercise of freedom 
of expression. Accordingly, no violation of Article 10 of the Convention has been established”. 
 
- ECtHR 11 March 2014, Yaman Akdeniz v. Turkey, Appl. no. 20877/10 (dec.) 
In this case the applicant complained about the blocking by the authorities of two websites, offering 
access to music. The websites (myspace.com and last.fm) were blocked because they offered access 
to music in an unlawful way, infringing the copyrights and related rights of right holders. The 
applicant complained that the enforcement of copyright was overbroad in this case, breaching his 
right to freedom to receive information as guaranteed under Article 10 ECHR. The Court reiterates 
the importance of having access to the Internet  and the importance of the Internet to facilitate the 
communication of information. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the applicant cannot be 
considered as a victim of the blocking of the websites of which he claimed to be a regular visitor of 
user: “Toutefois, pour la Cour, le seul fait que le requérant – tout comme les autres utilisateurs en 
Turquie des sites en question – subit les effets indirects d’une mesure de blocage concernant deux 
sites consacrés à la diffusion de la musique ne saurait suffire pour qu’il se voie reconnaître la qualité 
de « victime » au sens de l’article 34 de la Convention”. The Court is also of the view that access to 
music does not facilitate the applicant to take part in public debate on matters of interest for society 
and that many others ways were open in order to have access to music in a legal way. Therefore the 
Court declared the application inadmissible, the applicant not having the quality of victim of an 
alleged human rights violation under Article 10 ECHR, in the sense of Article 34 and 35 §§ 3 and 4 of 
the Convention. 
 
5. Most important issues on the agenda in 2015 
 
The Grand Chamber is to deliver ten judgments with major impact on the right to freedom of 
expression in Europe 
The Grand Chamber is to deliver in 2015 a series of judgments with an important impact on the 
freedom of expression in Europe. In application of Article 43 of the Convention the panel deciding of 
request for referral to the Grand Chamber, in each of these cases was of the opinion that they raised 
serious questions affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention, or concern serious 
issues of general importance, in which the Grand Chamber of 17 judges is to deliver a final judgment. 
Out of the 24 cases referred to the Grand Chamber (situation on 10 March 2015),  ten of them 
concern alleged violations of Article 10 of the Convention.  
Three cases concern the earlier non-finding of a violation of Article 10 
1. In Delfi AS v. Estonia (ECtHR 10 October 2013, Appl. No. 64569/09) the Chamber judgment saw no 
sufficient reason to oppose against the liability of an online news platform that had published 
insulting and defamatory comments on its website by readers.24 
 
In our review 2013 it has been reported that the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights 
found no violation in the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia (ECtHR 10 October 2013), which concerns the 
liability of an Internet news portal for offensive comments that were posted by readers below one of 
its online news articles. The Chamber’s judgment however did not become final, as on 17 February 
2014 the panel of five judges, in application of Article 43 of the Convention, decided to refer the case 
to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. 
In its judgment of 10 October 2013 the European Court has found that one of Estonia’s largest news 
portals on the Internet, Delfi, was not exempted from liability for grossly insulting remarks in its 
readers’ online comments. The news portal was found liable for violating the personality rights of a 
plaintiff, although it had expeditiously removed the grossly offending comments posted on its 
website as soon as it had been informed of their insulting character. In particular, the domestic 
courts rejected the portal’s argument that, under EU Directive 2000/31/EC on Electronic Commerce, 
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 See also D. Voorhoof, “ Qualification of news portal as publisher of users’ comment may have far-reaching 
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its role as an Internet society service provider or storage host was merely technical, passive and 
neutral, finding that the portal exercised control over the publication of comments. The First Section 
of the European Court was unanimously of the opinion that the finding of liability by the Estonian 
courts was a justified and proportionate restriction on the portal’s right to freedom of expression, in 
particular, because the comments were highly offensive, while the portal failed to prevent them 
from becoming public and allowed their authors to remain anonymous. Furthermore the award of 
damages (320 Euro) imposed by the Estonian courts was not excessive. 
 
The panel of five judges has decided however, on requests of Delfi AS, that the case raises a serious 
question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention, or concerns a serious issue of 
general importance, in which the Grand Chamber is now to deliver a final judgment. In its request for 
referral, Delfi argued that EU law, as well as other international reports and policy documents of the 
Council of Europe reflect the principle that in order to safeguard the right to freedom of expression 
and information on the internet, there should be no obligation for internet service providers to 
proactively monitor user generated content. Delfi was supported in its request for a referral to the 
Grand Chamber by a coalition of media-organisations, NGOs and civil society organisations 
advocating for freedom of expression on the internet. The hearing in the case before the 17 judges of 
the Grand Chamber took place on 9 July 2014. The final judgment by the Grand Chamber is expected 
before summer 2015. 
2. In Pentikäinen v. Finland (ECtHR 4 Febuary 2014, Appl. No. 11882/10) the European Court found 
that a Finnish press photographer’s conviction of disobeying the police while covering a 
demonstration did not breach his freedom of expression either.  In both cases the applicants are 
supported by professional organisations of journalists in their claims in order to persuade the Grand 
Chamber that the practices and convictions in the cases of Delfi AS an Pentikäinen are to considered 
violations of Article 10.25 
 
In a judgment of 4 February 2014 the European Court found that a Finnish press photographer’s 
conviction of disobeying the police while covering a demonstration did not breach his freedom of 
expression. The applicant, Mr Pentikäinen, is a photographer and journalist for the weekly magazine 
Suomen Kuvalehti. He was sent by his employer to take photographs of a large demonstration in 
Helsinki. At a certain moment the police decided to interrupt the demonstration which had turned 
violent. It was announced over loudspeakers that the demonstration was stopped and that the 
crowd should leave the scene. After further escalation of violence, the police considered that the 
event had turned into a riot and decided to seal off the demonstration area. When leaving, the 
demonstrators were asked to show ID and their belongings were checked. However, a core group of 
around 20 people remained in the demonstration area, including Mr Pentikäinen, who assumed the 
order to leave the area only applied to the demonstrators and not on him, doing his work as a 
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journalist. He also tried to make clear to the police that he was a representative of the media, 
referring to his press badge. A short time later the police arrested the demonstrators, including Mr 
Pentikäinen. He was detained  for more than 17 hours and short time later the public prosecutor 
brought charges against him. The Finnish courts found the journalist guilty of disobeying the police, 
but they did not impose any penalty on him, holding that his offence was excusable. 
In Strasbourg Mr Pentikäinen complained that his rights under Article 10 (freedom of expression) had 
been violated by his arrest and conviction, as he had been prevented from doing his job as a 
journalist. The European Court recognised that Mr Pentikäinen as a newspaper photographer and 
journalist has been confronted with an interference in his right to freedom of expression. However, 
as the interference was prescribed by law, pursued several legitimate aims (the protection of public 
safety and the prevention of disorder and crime) and was to be considered necessary in a democratic 
society, there was no violation of his right under Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court 
especially referred to the fact that Mr Pentikäinen had not been prevented from taking photos of the 
demonstration and that no equipment or photo’s had been confiscated. There was no doubt that the 
demonstration had been a matter of legitimate public interest justifying that the media reported on 
it, and Mr Pentikäinen was not prevented to do so. His arrest was a consequence of his decision to 
ignore the police orders to leave the area, while there was also a separate secure area which had 
been reserved for the press. It was also doubtful whether Mr Pentikäinen had made it sufficiently 
clear to the police when being arrested that he was a journalist. Furthermore, although Mr 
Pentikäinen was found guilty of disobeying the police, no penalty had been imposed on him and no 
entry of his conviction had been made in his criminal record. The Court also considered that the fact 
that the applicant was a journalist did not give him a greater right to stay at the scene than the other 
people and that the conduct sanctioned by the criminal conviction was not his journalistic activity as 
such, but his refusal to comply with a police order at the very end of the demonstration, when the 
latter was judged by the police to have become a riot. The European Court concluded therefore, by 
five votes to two, that the Finnish courts had struck a fair balance between the competing interests 
at stake and accordingly came to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 10.   
According to the separate dissenting opinion of two judges it has not been substantiated why it was 
necessary in a democratic society to equate a professional journalist, operating within recognised 
professional limits in covering the demonstration, with any of the people taking part in the 
demonstration and to impose drastic criminal restraints on him. The dissenting judges criticized 
sharply the imposition of restrictions on a journalist’s freedom of expression through his arrest, 
detention, prosecution and conviction for a criminal offence simply because he had the courage to 
do his duty in furtherance of the public interest. According to the dissenting judges the case reveals a 
one-sided attitude on the part of the Finnish authorities, one likely to create a “chilling effect” on 
press freedom. 
Pentikäinen requested for a referral to the Grand Chamber. His claim was supported by the Finnish 
Union of Journalists, the International Federation of Journalists and the European Federation of 
Journalists, arguing that the Court’s finding risked to undermine press freedom and the rights of 
journalists covering issues of importance for society. On 2 June 2014 the panel decided to refer this 
case to the Grand Chamber. The hearing took place  on 17 December 2014. The final judgment is 
expected in 2015. 
3. The third case referred to the Grand Chamber in which the Chamber did not find a violation of 
Article 10 is Morice v. France (ECtHR 11 July 2013, Appl. No. 29369/10). The Grand Chamber’s final 
judgment in the case Morice v. France will certainly have a significant impact on how lawyers can use 
their right to freedom of expression by bringing dysfunctions within the administration of justice 
under public attention. The hearing before the Grand Chamber was on 25 May 2014. In this case the 
Fifth Section of the ECtHR found that the conviction of a lawyer, Mr. Morice, for public defamation of 
a judge was not in breach with Article 10 ECHR. The conviction was based on an article in the daily 
newspaper Le Monde, stating that Mr. Morice, in his capacity as a lawyer, had “vigorously” 
challenged a judge before the Minister of Justice, accusing her of “conduct that was completely 
contrary to the principles of impartiality and loyalty”. The Court considered that the national courts 
could have been satisfied that the comments made by Mr. Morice in Le Monde were serious and 
insulting to the judge in question, that they were capable of unnecessarily undermining public 
confidence in the judicial system and, lastly, that there were sufficient grounds to convict Mr. Morice 
of public defamation. It is worth noting that in her dissenting opinion, judge Yudkivska found that the 
majority  of the Chamber didn’t take sufficiently in account the possible chilling effect of the criminal 
conviction of Mr. Morice. She also emphasised the role of lawyers to criticise dysfunctions within the 
administration of justice and to inform the public of this. The judgment of the Grand Chamber, 
whatever the outcome, promises to have a manifest impact on the development of the lawyer’s 
identity and his responsibilities towards society (ECtHR 11 July 2013, Morice v. France, not final, case 
referred to Grand Chamber on 9 December 2013, hearing 25 May 2014). 
 
Update: on 23 April 2014 the Grand Chamber, unanimously, found a violation of Article 10 in this 
case. The Grand Chamber is of the opinion  that Morice, in the newspaper Le Monde had expressed 
value judgments with a sufficient factual basis and that his remarks concerning a matter of public 
interest, had not exceeded the limits of the right to freedom of expression. The Court takes the view 
that the impugned remarks published in Le Monde concerned a high-profile case that created 
discussion about the functioning of the judiciary. As such a context of a debate on a matter of public 
interest calls for a high level of protection of freedom of expression, only a particularly narrow 
margin of appreciation is left to the domestic authorities, leading to a strict scrutiny by the European 
Court whether the interference at issue can be justified as being necessary in a democratic society. 
As regard the nature of the impugned remarks the Court is of the opinion that they were more value 
judgments than pure statements of fact, reflecting mainly an overall assessment of the conduct of 
the investigating judges in the course of the investigation. Furthermore the remarks had a sufficient 
factual basis and could not be regarded as misleading or as a gratuitous attack on the reputation or 
the integrity of the two investigative judges. The Grand Chamber considers that the respect for the 
authority of the judiciary cannot justify an unlimited restriction on the right to freedom of 
expression. Although the defence of a client by his lawyer must be conducted not in the media, but in 
the courts of competent jurisdiction, involving the use of any available remedies, the Grand Chamber 
accepts that there might be “very specific circumstances” justifying a lawyer making public 
statements in the media, such as in the case at issue. According to the Court, “a lawyer should be 
able to draw the public’s attention to potential shortcomings in the justice system; the judiciary may 
benefit from constructive criticism”.26 
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 In seven other cases it is to awaited whether the Grand Chamber will confirm the Chambers’ earlier 
findings of violations of Article 10. In these cases indeed the Court’s chamber did find violations of 
Article 10. It is striking that the Panel accepted some of these cases to be referred to the Grand 
Chamber. That seven cases in which the Chamber earlier found a violation are referred to the Grand 
Chamber also indicates that there is actually a level of uncertainty within the Strasbourg Court how 
finally to decide on these cases. 
 
1. Perinçek v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 27510/08 
This case concerns the conviction of incitement to hatred because of denial of the Armenian 
genocide. In this case the Grand Chamber is challenged with the question whether memory laws ‘as 
such’ can justify criminal convictions for denial of genocide, or whether the conviction of Perinçek 
can be justified as it is to be considered as a form of hate speech, inciting to hatred and 
discrimination against the Armenian population.27 
In Perinçek v. Switzerland the Second section of the Court ruled by five votes to two, that Switzerland 
violated the right to freedom of expression by convicting Doğu Perinçek, chairman of the Turkish 
Workers’ Party, of publicly challenging the existence of the genocide against the Armenian people. 
The Swiss Courts found Perinçek guilty of racial discrimination within the meaning of Article 261bis of 
the Swiss Criminal Code. According to the Swiss Courts, the Armenian genocide, like the Jewish 
genocide, was a proven historical fact, recognised by the Swiss Parliament, while Perinçek’s motives 
in denying this historical fact were of a racist tendency and did not contribute to the historical 
debate. The Second section of the European Court however clearly distinguished the discussions on 
the legal qualification of the atrocities perpetrated against the Armenian people in the first decades 
of the 20th century from those concerning the negation of the crimes of the Holocaust, committed by 
the Nazi-regime short before and during World War II. The Court took the view that Switzerland had 
failed to show how there was a social need in that country to punish an individual for racial 
discrimination on the basis of declarations challenging the legal characterisation as “genocide” of 
acts perpetrated on the territory of the former Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the following years. The 
Swiss Government requested for the referral to the Grand Chamber in order to reconsider the 
approach and reasoning of the majority of the Second section, finding that there has been a violation 
of Article 10. After the panel referred the case to the Grand Chamber on 2 June 2014, the hearing 
took place on the 28 January 2015. 
 
2. Kudrevičius  and  Others  v.  Lithuania, Appl. No.  37553/05. 
This pending case concerns  the  conviction  of five  farmers  for  rioting,  following  a  protest  in  
which  they  had  blockaded  major  roads during a dispute with the Government over the price of 
milk. In this case to, the Chamber found a violation of Art. 10 ECHR. The Panel’s referral was on 14 
April 2014, the hearing was planned on 26 November 2014, but has been cancelled. 
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 See D. Voorhoof, “Criminal conviction for denying the existence of the Armenian “genocide” violates 
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genocide-denial.html 
3. A.B. v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 56925/08. 
In  its  Chamber  judgment  of  1  July  2014  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  held,  by  four  
votes  to three,  that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  Article  10  of  the  Convention.  It  found  in  
particular  that  the Swiss  Government  had  not  established  how  the  disclosure  of  this  type  of  
confidential  information could  have  had  a  negative  influence  on  both  the  accused’s  right  to  be  
presumed  innocent  and  the outcome  of  his  trial.  It  further  noted  that  the  accused  had  a  
remedy  under  Swiss  law  by  which  he could  have  sought  redress  for  the  damage  to  his  
reputation,  but  that  he  had  not  used  it,  and  that  it was primarily for him to take action to 
ensure respect for his private life. On  17  November  2014  the  case  was  referred  to  the  Grand  
Chamber  at  the  request  of  the  Swiss Government.  The Court will be holding a hearing in this case 
on 13 May 2015. 
 
4. Baka v. Hungary , Appl. No. 20261/12. 
In its judgment of 27 May 2014 the ECtHR concluded, unanimously, that there had been a violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. It found that  Mr  Baka’s  dismissal as a judge had  been  due  to  the  
criticism  he  had  publicly  expressed  of  government policy  on  judicial  reform  when  he  was  
President  of  the  Supreme  Court. The Chamber’s judgment underlined that  the  fear  of sanction,  
such  as  losing  judicial  office,  could  have  a  “chilling  effect”  on  the  exercise  of  freedom  of 
expression  and  risked  discouraging  judges  from  making  critical  remarks  about  public  
institutions  or policies. On 15 December 2014 the was referred to the Grand Chamber. The Court will 
be holding a hearing on 17 June 2015. 
 
5. Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Ass. v. France, Appl. No. 40454/07. 
In its Chamber judgment of 12 June 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held, by four votes to 
three,  that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  Article  10  of  the  Convention.  The  applicants  are  
Anne-Marie  Couderc, the  publication  director of the weekly magazine Paris-Match, and the 
company Hachette Filipacchi Associés, which publishes the magazine. In 2005 the English newspaper 
the Daily Mail published claims by Ms C. that Albert Grimaldi, the  reigning  Prince  of  Monaco,  was  
the  father  of  her  son.  The  newspaper  reproduced  the  main points  of  an  article  due  to  be  
published  in  Paris-Match.  Prince  Albert  of  Monaco,  having  learnt  that an  article  was  about  to  
appear  in  Paris-Match,  served  notice  on  the  applicants  to  refrain  from publishing  the  article.  
The  magazine  went  ahead  and  published  the  article,  together  with photographs  showing  the  
Prince  with  the  child,  which  appeared  simultaneously  in  the  German weekly magazine Bunte.  
Prince  Albert  of  Monaco  brought  proceedings  against  the  applicants. The Court of Appeal  
awarded  Prince  Albert  50,000  euros  (EUR)  in  damages  and  ordered details  of  the  judgment  to  
be  printed in Paris-Match, finding that the article in Paris-Match had  caused  irreversible  damage  
to  the  Prince,  as  the  fact  that  he  was  the  child’s  father,  which  had remained  secret  until  
publication  of  the  article,  had  suddenly  become  public  knowledge,  against  his wishes. The 
whole article and the  accompanying  pictures  were considered to come within  the  most  intimate  
sphere  of  the  Prince’s  emotional  and family life and were not apt to be the subject of any debate 
of general interest. 
The  ECtHR however found  that  the judgment against the applicants had made no distinction 
between information which formed part of a  debate  of  general  interest  and  that  which  merely  
reported  details  of  the  private  life  of  the  Prince of  Monaco.  Nor  did  the  case  simply  concern  
a  dispute  between  the  press  and  a  public  figure;  the interests  of  Ms  C.  and  the  child  in  
asserting  his  existence  and  having  his  identity  recognised  had  also been  at  stake.  In  the  
Court’s  view,  there  was  no  reasonable  relationship  of  proportionality  between the  restrictions  
imposed  on  the  right  to  freedom  of  expression  and  the  protection  of  the  reputation and rights 
of others. On  13  October  2014  the  case  was  referred  to  the  Grand  Chamber  at  the  request  of  
the  French Government.28 
6/7. On 16  February  2015  the  Grand  Chamber  panel  of  five  judges  decided  to refer two cases 
to  the  Grand  Chamber  of  the  European  Court  of  Human Rights, related to Article 10 ECHR: 
Karácsony  and  Others  v.  Hungary  (Appl. No. 42461/13)  and  Szél  and  Others  v.  Hungary  (Appl. 
No. 44357/13). Both cases  concern  complaints  by  members  of  the  Hungarian  Parliament  of  two 
opposition  parties  about  having  been  fined,  for  gravely  disturbing  Parliament’s  work,  following  
their protests against two legislative proposals. In  its  Chamber  judgments  of  16 September  2014  
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  held, unanimously (!),  that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  
Article  10  of  the  Convention.  The  Court  found  that the  sanctions  had  been  disproportionate.  
In  particular,  they  had  been  imposed  by  the  Speaker  of Parliament  without  compelling  
reasons,  without  a  previous  warning,  and  they  had  been  adopted without  a  debate.  The  Court  
further  found  a  violation  of  Article  13  in  conjunction  with  Article  10,  as the applicants did not 
have an effective remedy under Hungarian law in respect of their complaints. 
Coda 
An issue which already had reached prominent attention,29 has now, after the assassination of 
journalists and cartoonist of Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015, become predominantly on the agenda: 
the issue of the protection of journalism against violence and safety of journalists and other media 
actors.  
A judgment, delivered in the very beginning of 2015, reflects the concerns of the ECtHR on this 
matter. The Court’s judgment is a robust statement for the need to protect journalists against 
violence and its compels the authorities of states where journalists or media workers are the victims 
of violent action to take all necessary measures to stop impunity and to protect them and to bring 
the perpetrators to court.  
 
ECtHR 29 January 2015, Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, Appl. No. 54204/08 
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 See the UN Action Plan on the Safety of Journalists and the issue of impunity, 
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In a case related to a violent attack on a journalist, the European Court reiterates that States, under 
their positive obligations of the Convention, are required to create a favourable environment for 
participation in public debate by all the persons concerned, enabling them to express their opinions 
and ideas without fear. Because of failures to carry out an effective investigation, the European Court 
finds that the criminal investigation of the journalist’s claim of ill-treatment was ineffective and that 
accordingly there has been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture, or inhuman or degrading 
treatment) of the Convention under its procedural limb. 
In this case, again30, the European Court finds numerous shortcomings in the investigation carried out 
by the domestic authorities. The Court inter alia referred to the fact that the journalist’s complaint 
was examined by the police office where the agent who had allegedly committed the offence was 
based. In the Court’s view, an investigation by the police into an allegation of misconduct by its one 
of own officers could not be independent in these circumstances. The Court also noted that, despite 
explicit requests by the journalist, the domestic authorities failed to take all steps reasonably 
available to them to secure the evidence concerning the attack. The Court further considered that 
the public statement by the Minister of Internal Affairs showed that during the investigation the 
domestic authorities were more concerned with proving the lack of involvement of a State agent in 
the attack on the journalist than with discovering the truth about the circumstances of that attack. In 
particular, it does not appear that adequate steps were taken to investigate the possibility that the 
attack could have been linked to Uzeyir Jafarov’s work as a journalist. On the contrary it appears that 
the responsible authorities had already discarded that possibility in the early stages of the 
investigation and with insufficient reason. These elements were sufficient to enable the Court to 
conclude that the investigation of the journalist’s claim of ill-treatment was ineffective. There has 
accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb. 
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